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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 
In Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Pavel Ciaian and Johan Swinnen  
 
 
Introduction and summary 
 
The objective of this chapter is to document and explain the extent of policy distortions to 
agricultural market incentives in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the past decades.
1 In 
doing so we provide an historical review of the policy changes in the CEE and we calculate 
indicators of direct and indirect assistance to agriculture and of taxation of consumers. The 
country coverage includes the eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that 
joined the European Union in 2004 (CEU-8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), plus the two countries that joined the EU in 2007 
(Romania and Bulgaria). The other big economies of Eastern Europe – Russia, Turkey and 
Ukraine – are not discussed here but are the subject of parallel studies by Liefert and Liefert 
(2007), Burrell (2007) and von Cramon-Taubadel et al. (2007). 
Agricultural production and food consumption in these countries were heavily 
subsidized under the communist system, distorting incentives for both consumers and 
producers. With consumer retail prices set low and producer prices high, the gap was covered 
by direct subsidies to processing and trading companies or by soft budget constraints. 
However, at the same time exchange rates were overvalued and assistance to non-agricultural 
industries negatively affected agriculture. The net effect of all these distortions is difficult to 
estimate accurately, but there is general agreement among experts that agriculture was 
assisted relative to non-agriculture in the latter 1980s. One indicator of that is the fact that, at 
the end of the 1980s, direct budgetary subsidies to agriculture and food were between 5 and 
10 percent of GDP in most CEECs.   
                                                 
1 The policy focus is on price, trade and subsidy policies. Policy distortions and reforms in other areas, such as 
property rights, land reform, etc. -- which played a very important role in the 1990s in these countries -- are not 
discussed in this chapter.     3
  In the late 1980s and early 1990s subsidies were cut, prices, trade, and exchange rates 
liberalized, and many distortions removed. The net result was a major reduction in direct 
assistance to farmers. On average the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture (NRA) was 
close to zero in the early 1990s. Consumers experienced offsetting effects. While they got 
access to a much wider set of options in terms of quantity and quality of food products, retail 
food prices increased substantially in real terms.   
  After the initial liberalizations, assistance to agriculture increased again, 
gradually but substantially, from an average NRA of around 0 percent in 1992 to around 40 
percent in 1998, after which it stabilized as the CEECs began preparing for accession to the 
EU. In 2004 there was an increase in assistance to farmers as the agricultural policy regimes 
in CEE became integrated into the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). That included a 
gradual change in policy instruments also: there was a reduction in the use of market support 
and output subsidies in the 1990s compared to the 1980s, with direct payments and other 
support to agriculture making up a very substantive part of total assistance to agriculture by 
2000. Not surprisingly, farm incomes increased strongly with accession. This was true even 
for non-landowners whose rent payments went up. 
During the past decade indirect disincentives to agriculture in the CEECs was limited. 
Exchange rate distortions were largely removed by the second half of the 1990s, and indirect 
taxation through tariffs on the rest of the economy was equivalent to less than 10 percent on 
average, and decreasing over time.  
  In recent years, the most highly supported agricultural sectors were in Slovenia and 
Latvia, countries where agriculture represents a small share of the economy, while protection 
was lowest in Bulgaria, Poland, and Estonia. There was considerable variation among 
countries and commodities though. In our political economy analysis below, we show that 
structural differences in the CEE economies are associated with different support levels, that 
international agreements have played some (albeit limited) role in affecting policy distortions, 
and that budgetary and human capital constraints played a role. More specifically:   
•  Agricultural support is higher, ceteris paribus, in richer countries, in import-
competing industries which lack a comparative advantage, or in industries that are 
negatively affected by economic changes such as real exchange rate appreciations.    
•  Regional trade agreements and EU accession agreement have had a limited effect on 
policy distortions.    4
•  WTO trade agreements were much more constraining for the countries that joined in 
the second half of the 1990s or later than for those that joined before.  
•  Budgetary constraints have limited CEE government expenditure on agricultural 
support, in particular in the 1990s, while inexperience in policy-setting in a market 
environment had some serious effects on policy design and reversals in the 1990s. 
While much has been accomplished in removing distortions to agricultural incentives 
in CEE in the 1990s, there is much room for further reductions of distortions to agricultural 
incentives. Improving policies and reducing distortions can be done through overall 
reductions in support policies, shifting support to less-distortive policy instruments, focusing 
budgetary expenditures on public good investments rather than farm subsidies, shifting from 
a quantity-based to a quality-based policy paradigm, etc. Such reforms would not be 
inconsistent with EU accession, as the EU has moved to more decoupled farm support in 
recent years. Moreover, further reforms are underway in the EU with important implications 
for distortions in the CEE, such as reforms of some of the commodity regimes and the shift 
from per hectare payments to single farm payments. These too will be implemented in the 
CEE in the coming years. 
Also important have been other reforms, such as regulatory reforms to stimulate food 
industry investment and labor market reforms to enhance off-farm employment opportunities. 
A crucial component of this is a shift in the policy paradigm from policies focused on 
quantity and basic standards to one focused on quality and high standards. Food safety and 
quality standards are increasingly crucial components of modern food chains, both 
domestically and internationally. Competition and anti-trust policy is another important area 
for policy attention. In supply chains where farms have to sell their products to trading, 
processing, and retailing companies, the ability to choose freely between companies is of 
crucial importance in getting better conditions for farms.  
From the perspective of further reforms and consolidating reforms in the future, the 
ongoing WTO negotiations may impose further discipline on agricultural policy distortions. 
Indirectly, the WTO agreements have already had major impacts on CEE distortions, as they 
have imposed constraints on the policies and the distortions that an enlarged EU-27 could 
implement. That contributed to the EU policy reforms this decade, which is resulting in lower 
distortions in the CEE than would otherwise have been the case. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section we give a historical overview 
of the changes in government policies affecting agriculture and food consumers that have   5
taken place over the past decades. We then present our estimates of the extent of producer 
and consumer assistance and the policy distortions. As discussed there, the methodology is a 
slight modification of that detailed in Anderson et al. (2006), and we make extensive use of 
data collected by international organizations such as FAO, GTAP, Eurostat, the World Bank, 
the UN and especially the OECD’s producer support estimates (PSEs). In the following 
section we review a series of political economy factors that have affected policy choices and 
see to what extent they can help in explaining the changes and differences in policy 
distortions in CEE agriculture. The final section identifies some lessons and prospects for 
reducing distortions in the future. 
 
 
Historical perspective on agriculture and policy distortions 
 
  
Until the Second World War, agriculture in the Central and East European countries was 
organized much like that in the neighboring West European countries. By the 1940s 
agriculture made up a considerable share of total output and a large share of total 
employment, although there was substantial variation between countries.    
 
The communist period 
 
After World War II the CEE economies were subject to Communist rule. Land and farms 
were put under central planning and in most countries (with the exception of Poland and the 
former Yugoslavia) farming was forcefully organized into collective and state farms.  
The central planning of the agricultural economy resulted in distorted allocations of 
production factors and distorted incentives for consumers and producers. Consumer prices 
were set low and producer prices high, with the gap covered by direct subsidies to processing 
and trading companies or by soft budget constraints.   
  More specifically, in the late 1960s the leadership of the USSR decided to increase 
agricultural production, with a strong emphasis on livestock, a policy the Eastern European 
countries of the Soviet Bloc generally followed (Liefert and Swinnen 2002). As a 
consequence, livestock herds and output in these countries grew by 40 to 60 percent between 
1970 and 1990. The rise in feed requirements caused by the growing herds stimulated the   6
crop sector. In the late 1980s, the average annual output of feed grain in Poland and Hungary 
was up by half and one-quarter, respectively, compared with output in the late 1960s. In the 
USSR the feed requirements were so great that the country also became a substantial importer 
of feed commodities. 
  By 1990, per capita consumption of livestock products and foodstuffs in general 
compared favorably with many OECD countries, even though income in the Central and East 
European countries was much lower than the OECD average. This “achievement” came at a 
cost though, as large state subsidies, to both producers and consumers, were necessary to 
maintain the high levels of production and consumption. For example, at the end of the 1980s 
direct budgetary subsidies to the agriculture and food economy were between 5 and 10 
percent of GDP in most CEECs, with the bulk of these subsidies going to the livestock sector.  
  Because of these measures, agriculture made up a sizeable share of the CEE 
economies in the 1980s: 15 percent of output and 25 percent of employment on average. 
While there was large variation (for example the agricultural employment share at the end of 
the 1980s varied from 27 percent in Poland to 8 percent in Slovenia), the distortions ensured 
a relatively large share of resources stayed in agriculture rather than being more efficiently 
used in other sectors of the economy.  
  However, while both consumers and producers were strongly subsidized in nominal 
terms by high output and low input price settings under the Communist regime, interventions 
and regulations in the rest of the economy had counteracting effects on agriculture: several 
industrial sectors were also subsidized, and administratively set exchange rates discouraged 
all tradable sectors. The net effect of these various distortions is very different to measure, 
but experts generally agree that agriculture in CEE was heavily subsidized in the 1970s and 
1980s (Brooks and Nash 2002, Cook et al. 1991, Liefert and Swinnen 2002, OECD 1996, and 
Valdes 2000). 
 
The transition period, 1989 to 2000 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, rapid changes took place in the Central and Eastern 
European countries. We identify the 1990s as the period of transition, with three phases of 
change in agricultural price and trade policies during that decade. The distinction of these 
phases is useful to understand the changes of the agricultural policies and the distortions 
during the period “between Communism and the European Union”, even though in reality   7
these periods are not as clearly separated as presented here, and not all the countries moved 
from one phase to the next at the same time. 
 
Phase One: Liberalization 
In the first phase (sometime between 1988 and 1992, depending on the country) a large set of 
price and trade regimes were liberalized and subsidies to producers and consumers reduced, 
accompanied by macro-economic reforms. As a result, consumer prices soared and real 
incomes often declined, so domestic demand fell. Reduced domestic demands, together with 
falling incomes and subsidy cuts, were reinforced by falling foreign demand for CEEC 
products and increased import competition from Western countries. 
The impact on consumers was mixed: real food prices increased, but access to higher-
quality food products also improved – directly through imports, and indirectly through 
enhanced competition which forced domestic food companies to improve their standards.   
The impact on producers was more dramatic. Farm input prices increased strongly 
relative to producers’ output prices, causing a strong decline in agricultural terms of trade and 
hence in agricultural output in the early 1990s (Figure 1). Macours and Swinnen (2000) 
estimate that the terms of trade effect alone caused 40-50 per cent of the decline in CEE crop 
output over the 1989-1995 period. 
The liberalizations caused a contraction not only in agricultural production but also a 
decline in the industrial sector. In the case of services, by contrast, output expanded rapidly as 
that sector had been constrained by Communist regulations (Figure 2). 
 
Phase Two: Fire-brigade policymaking 
The decline in farm incomes and soaring food prices caused a lot of social conflict, leading to 
political demands for government intervention, support and state regulation. As a result, in 
the second phase, still in the first half of the 1990s, CEE governments responded to this 
pressure by (re-)introducing price and trade interventions to protect consumers and producers 
against negative real income effects of the liberalization and other reforms.
2 However many 
of these inventions occurred in an ad hoc fashion, since CEE governments and their 
administrations were inexperienced in implementing policies in the emerging market 
economy. Governments reacted to unanticipated policy effects by introducing more ad hoc 
                                                 
2 See also Valdes (2000), who analyzes agricultural support in the period 1994-1997 in, among other countries, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. 
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regulations, adding to the uncertainty induced by general economic reforms. The nature of 
the response has been described as “fire-brigade” policy-making.  
 
Phase Three: Policy consolidation 
In the third phase, from the mid-1990s, CEE governments moved to formulate more 
comprehensive agricultural policies for long-term intervention in agriculture. Some 
governments introduced policy instruments that already resembled, at least in design, the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) prior to the MacSharry reforms. Such ‘CAP-style’ 
agricultural policy packages included guaranteed prices, production quotas, export subsidies, 
and (variable) import levies. Most of the policy regimes passed through various degrees of re-
instrumentation, either to address domestic policy objectives, to comply with international 
agreements, or, later, to bring agricultural policies more in line with those of the EU. For 
example, some of the countries in the ‘first wave’ of applicants for accession to the EU soon 
modified their policy regimes to include more direct payments and other subsidies and 
somewhat less reliance on market price support (Hartell and Swinnen 1998).   
 
The pre-EU accession period: 2000 to 2004 
 
One could consider the dramatic end of the political and economic restructuring of the 
CEECs the integration of eight of these countries in the EU in 2004. However, in many 
aspects, EU enlargement effectively started several years before 2004 (Swinnen 2002). Trade 
integration and foreign investment grew rapidly, in the late 1990s the gap in product quality 
and prices in East and West Europe gradually reduced, and policy convergence started with 
many CEECs implementing CAP instruments or at least preparing to put them in place.  
Preparing policies for accession was often referred to as trying to hit a “moving 
target”, as there was considerable discussion of CAP reform in anticipation of enlargement 
and important EU decisions were made in 1999 and in 2002. In 1999 the first financial 
framework for the 2000-2006 period was agreed, which included assumptions about the 
agricultural policy framework for enlargement. In 2002 important changes were introduced, 
partly as a result of pressure from the CEECs, and in December 2002 the final accession 
framework was agreed.
3 This gave CEEC governments a much clearer policy adjustment 
                                                 
3 The debate on how to extend the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy to the accession countries and, more 
specifically, on the budgetary and trade implications of extending the CAP to the new accession countries, 
played a prominent role in the entire enlargement debate. In 1999 the so-called Agenda 2000 reforms of the   9
path and they could start preparing for the implementation of the so-called acquis 
communautaire –the set of laws, regulations and instruments required for entrance to the EU. 
This implementation procedure required the adjustment of their agricultural policy systems to 
make them consistent with the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU.  
  
Accession to the European Union in 2004 
 
In May 2004, eight Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU (plus Cyprus and 
Malta, not discussed here). The accession process was characterized by last-minute 
negotiations on farm subsidies and production quotas, but their agricultural sectors are now 
integrated into the CAP even though, in the first years of accession, farmers in the eight “new 
member states” (NMS) will receive less subsidies than farmers of the EU-15. 
  The extension of substantial subsidies to CEEC farmers, especially compared to local 
income standards, had an important impact on farm incomes and rural market distortions. On 
average agricultural incomes in the eight new member states in 2004 were 61 percent higher 
than in 2003 (Table 1). Only part of that increase was due to poor weather in 2003.  
The equity and efficiency effects of these higher payments depend on existing factor 
market imperfections, in particular the functioning of the land market (Ciaian and Swinnen 
2006). In all NMS, the subsidies led to rapid land price increases, benefiting land owners. 
Land prices approximately doubled in, for example, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
between 2002 and 2006 (Swinnen and Vranken 2007). However, because farm and 
landownership structures differ strongly between countries, the effects of the subsidies on 
                                                                                                                                                        
CAP were decided by the EU-15, at least partly in anticipation of enlargement. These reforms transferred 
support from market interventions to direct (per hectare or per animal) payments, and provided a policy 
framework for the next six years, including enlargement.   
  The Financial Framework for enlargement, also agreed in 1999, made several assumptions regarding 
Eastern enlargement, including that six new member states would join by 2002 and that farms in the new 
member countries would not qualify for direct income support. Despite much opposition from EU-15 member 
countries against extending the direct payments to CEEC farmers, all the candidate countries were united in 
their insistence on “equal” treatment of their farmers from the moment of accession, that is, they demanded the 
same subsidies as EU-15 farmers, including direct payments. 
  As it became clear that enlargement would start later, but with more countries, the Commission made 
new proposals. The Council decisions made in the Brussels and Copenhagen Summits in the fall of 2002 
provided a revised financial framework for both the enlargement process and future CAP reforms. First, the EU 
Council of Ministers followed the Commission proposal to phase in the direct payments. The CEECs would 
receive the equivalent of 25 percent of EU-15 direct payments in 2004, 30 percent in 2005, 35 percent in 2006, 
and rising to 100 percent by 2013. Later, following strong pressure from the CEECs, the European Council 
agreed to increase direct payments to CEECs to 55 percent of the EU level in 2004, increasing to 100 percent by 
2010. However, the funding for these increases, the so-called “national top-up”, is to come from the CEECs 
themselves either directly or indirectly (Swinnen 2004). 
   10
farm incomes differ between NMS. In countries such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
farming is concentrated on large-scale corporate farms, who rent most of their land from the 
many fragmented land owners, many of whom live in urban areas. In contrast, in countries 
such as Poland and Slovenia, farming is dominated by small family farmers who own most of 
their land. The other countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, have a mixed structure.  
The presence of high transaction costs in the land market is constraining the necessary 
restructuring required to increase the competitiveness of the farm sector in NMS, and their 
increased subsidies over the 2007–2013 period are exacerbating that, possibly outweighing 
the gains in transaction cost reductions (Ciaian and Swinnen 2006). 
 
Transition changes in trade policy and trade agreements 
 
International trade was strongly regulated under the centrally planned system. The 
Communist countries were integrated in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) system, the planned inter-country trading regime, trading mainly with other 
communist countries. One could think of the CMEA as the international version of the 
domestic central planner. The CEE countries were less integrated than the countries Former 
Soviet Union (FSU), but still a large part of their trade volume went through the CMEA. The 
CMEA system collapsed in the early 1990s with the liberalization of the macro-economy and 
of trade policies, and caused important changes in trade and financial flows.   
   
Effects of trade liberalization  
Trade liberalization reinforced the reallocation of production activities caused by the 
abolishment of central planning. Traditional international production allocations were no 
longer possible when trade had to be financed by hard currencies and when inputs were 
accounted for at real costs. It also allowed the import of high-quality Western produce, which 
had been restricted earlier. The result was major international reorganization of production 
activities. Initially this had a very negative impact on CEEC producers, because the 
traditional export markets in the former Soviet Union dwindled due to a lack of hard currency 
and because Western countries remained closed to CEEC agricultural exports. At the same 
time the reduction of CEE import constraints opened CEEC markets to Western imports. In 
combination, this caused a worsening of the agricultural trade balance in CEECs in the first 
half of the 1990s (Figure 3).      11
Later on, however, trade between the CEECs and the EU-15 intensified, and growing 
exports to Western markets contributed to recovery in the CEECs. Trade flows in agricultural 
and food products in particular between the EU-15 and the CEECs have increased strongly 
since 1990, and in both directions.
4 Early predictions that the EU markets would be flooded 
by cheap eastern imports turned out wrong. True, the EU’s agri-food imports from CEECs 
doubled over the 1990s, but exports from the EU to CEE increased ten-fold. 
  Another important development was the shift from centrally imposed extreme 
specialisation (e.g., dairy production in the Baltics and cotton production in Central Asia) to 
more diversified production systems, thereby increasing domestic production of staple foods 
and reducing dependence on single commodities in those countries.  
  Possibly even more important than the trade effects was the massive inflow of 
Western foreign direct investment in the food industry in CEECs. That contributed to a major 
restructuring of the CEE food industry and to improvements in food quality and productivity 
(Dries and Swinnen 2004). Most recently, the wave of foreign investments in the retail sector 
has caused further restructurings of the agri-food system, with important implications for 
both producers and consumers (Dries, Reardon and Swinnen 2004).  
 
New trade agreements 
After the collapse of the CMEA regime around 1990, the CEECs have been part of several 
other trade agreements – some old, some new – but these generally had limited direct effects 
on their agricultural policy interventions. First, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovenia have been members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
since its creation in 1995. Bulgaria joined soon afterwards, and Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia 
joined in 1999 and 2001. The tariff structure in CEECs shows that both applied and bound 
                                                 
4  Trade integration is clear from Figure 3. The removal of non-tariff barriers as part of the EU accession was an 
important factor in stimulating CEEC-EU trade. Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2005) analyze the effect of non-tariff 
barriers on the CEECs’ agro-food exports to EU in the period just before enlargement. Despite preferential trade 
agreements, CEECs were essentially subject to the same access regulations in the EU market as any third 
country. Non-tariff barriers include sanitary and phytosanitary standards, quality, and import licensing. In 
principle, import licences became obsolete only when the CEECs join EU. The other two groups of measures, 
however, cease to represent trade barriers from the moment they are met by producers. Still, Chevassus-Lozza et 
al. (2005) show (for the CEECs that joined the EU in 2004, using a gravity model) that sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards indeed acted as a significant entry barrier to CEE exports to EU in 1999. In 2003 they 
still constrained trade, but the effect was smaller than in 1999, indicating that the number of firms fulfilling the 
standards has increased. Regarding quality regulations, they also restricted CEEC exports in 1999 but to a lesser 
extent than the sanitary and phytosanitary standards. In 2003 quality restriction did not constrain CEEC exports 
to EU anymore, as CEECs succeeded in adopting EU standards. Finally, import licensing increases the 
transaction costs of trade and significantly restricted CEEC exports in 1999 and 2003; these barriers were 
removed only after EU accession by the CEECs. 
   12
tariffs in the agri-food sector were considerably higher than in the EU-15: in 2001 the 
weighted average of bound tariff levels was 21.4 percent and of applied tariffs 13.1 percent, 
compared to 6.5 percent and 5.4 percent in the EU-15 (Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the 
Appendix). The large difference between bound and applied suggests the CEECs have not 
been constrained by WTO agreements (Bacchetta and Drabek 2002). This is especially so for 
the CEECs that joined early, as their commitments were based on the high support levels of 
the 1980s and therefore caused little constraint on their policies in the 1990s; for the others, 
the restrictions were more severe.
5 The latter countries liberalized their trade regimes 
unilaterally and have been able to negotiate the terms of their WTO accession within the 
scope of measures already taken. As a result, their WTO commitments are less "liberal" than 
the measures actually applied.   
  Second, there were also new trade agreements, most importantly the Central European 
Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA). However, the impact of 
these agreements on reducing agricultural policy distortions was generally limited, since the 
agreements included many exceptions for agricultural and food products and especially for 
so-called “sensitive products” which made up a substantial share of production. 
  However, the most important trade agreements were the (pre-)accession treaties with 
the EU, and later the effective integration of the CEECs into the EU, which we discuss 
elsewhere in this chapter.  
 
 
Measuring assistance to agriculture 
 
 
Methodology and approach  
                                                 
5  However some of these restrictions became important later with the EU accession process. In GATT terms, 
accession of the CEECs to the EU involved enlargement of a customs union. There are GATT rules for such 
cases, laid down in GATT Article XXIV. Essentially these rules apply to tariffs. However, as these rules date 
back to the times before the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), they do not relate to the new 
types of commitments established under the URAA (Tangermann 2000). Regarding tariffs, the EU and the 
CEECs had to satisfy other members of the WTO that EU enlargement does not result in a situation in which the 
overall level of agricultural protection and support in the enlarged EU violates the aggregate commitments that 
both had before enlargement. Tariff bindings in the CEECs in many cases were significantly below those bound 
and applied in the EU, so negotiations will have to be held in the WTO on how to compensate other countries 
for the increase in tariffs on their agricultural and food exports to the CEECs. How to treat commitments on 
agricultural export subsidies and domestic support is not regulated in these GATT provisions. However, there 
was the precedent of the EU Northern enlargement in 1995 (Burrell 2000). As for domestic support 
commitments, those of the EU-12 and those of the new member states were simply added. 
   13
 
The methodology used in this chapter for calculating assistance to agriculture follows the 
methodology as explained and documented in Anderson et al. (2006); and we refer readers to 
this document for explanations. We calculated nominal rate of assistance (NRA) for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural production, as well as the consumer tax equivalent (CTE) on 
food consumption.   
  The calculation of the NRA to agriculture is much more accurate than that for non-
agriculture, for several reasons mostly related to data. The two most important sources of 
indirect distortions to agriculture are exchange rate distortions and subsidies/taxes on other 
sectors of the economy. Regarding the former, we do not have (even reasonably) accurate 
measures of exchange rate distortions.
6 We only have indicators of black market exchange 
rates for some countries for some years. We will use these to illustrate the possible extent of 
the distortions caused by exchange rates (which is large). However, since black market 
exchange rates are not ideal measures of distortion, and since they are not consistently 
available, we have not included them in the NRAs. What is included in the non-agricultural 
NRAs is the trade weighted average of tariffs in the rest of the economy (including food 
processing), as a rough indicator of subsidization of the import-competing part of the rest of 
the economy. Clearly this is an imperfect measure, but it was all that was possible to calculate 
consistently across countries, for (at least) the most recent time period.  
  The NRA for agriculture includes direct payments such as subsidies per animal or 
subsidies per hectare, as well as variable input subsidies. The per unit value of both product-
specific direct payments and input subsidies are divided by the undistorted price and added to 
the market price support component of the NRA.   
  There are also “non-product specific subsidies”. These include government payments 
for research and development, agricultural schools, inspection services, infrastructure, 
marketing and promotion, public stockholdings and “miscellaneous”. Since some of these can 
be argued to be public goods, and their impact on agricultural incomes depends on the 
elasticity of demand (see, Alston, Edwards and Freebairn 1988, and Swinnen and de Gorter 
1998, 2001), so they are included separately from the direct assistance to individual products.  
More generally, some policy instruments are more distorting than others. Using 
OECD data, Dewbre, Anton, and Thompson (2001), and with market price support (MPS) as 
a benchmark of 100 percent, they conclude that variable input subsidies are the most 
                                                 
6 For attempts to capture the exchange rate induced distortions and protection, see Bojnec and Swinnen (1997), 
Bojnec, Münch and Swinnen (1996), and OECD (1994, 1995).   14
distortive instrument (around 130 percent), followed by output subsidies and market price 
support (100 percent), area payments which require the planting of crops (around 35 percent), 
and area payments which do not require planting of crops (around 10 percent). Therefore it is 
necessary to look at both the total calculated assistance as well as its composition, before 
drawing conclusions as to the distortions caused by policies.   
The rest of this section is organized as follows. To highlight the main effects and their 
changes over the years we present average indicators for the ten CEECs. However, there is 
considerable variation in the extent of policy distortions, the level of support, and the type of 
policy instruments used across countries and commodities. To demonstrate the differences 
between countries and commodities, and to understand the factors causing these differences, 
we focus especially on indicators for the year 2000: by 2000, almost a decade of reforms, 
institutional changes, and knowledge-accumulation of policy-making in a market 
environment had passed, and EU accession was a distant prospect in many countries. 
 
Indicators of assistance and taxation 
 
We first consider distortions to producer incentives, and then turn to those faced by food 
consumers. 
 
Assistance to agricultural production 
Liberalization resulted initially in major reductions of direct assistance to agriculture. The 
decline in assistance was especially dramatic in the countries where the support had been 
highest, in particular the FSU countries of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and in Bulgaria. By 
1992 the CEECs’ average agricultural NRA was close to zero including non-product specific 
subsidies. But soon after the initial liberalizations new interventions emerged, and these were 
consolidated into government intervention systems by the mid-1990s. The result of these new 
series of interventions was an increase in farm support, to around 40 percent by 1998, 
followed by some decline in the next two years to 25 percent and then a rise to 33 percent by 
2003, excluding non-product-specific supports (Figure 4). That is just below the comparable 
estimate for the EU-15 in 2003 of 37 percent (Josling 2007). 
  By 2000, the NRA level was 25 percent excluding non-product-specific supports, but 
29 percent when those non-product-specific supports are included. That year the highest level 
of producer assistance was in Slovenia at 76 percent, and the lowest was in Bulgaria at just 4   15
percent, while Latvia (38 percent), Romania (36 percent) and Slovakia (35 percent) all had 
NRA levels somewhat above the 29 percent CEE average (Figure 5).  
  Figure 6 illustrates the differences in NRAs across commodities in 2000 for the 
region. Most commodity NRAs averaged between 10 percent and 50 percent. Sugar stands 
out as the most protected commodity, with a NRA around 80 percent. At the other extreme, 
sheep meat and soybean received slightly negative NRAs that year. The full time series of 
NRAs by product from 1992 to 2003 is summarized for the ten CEECs in Table 2. 
To get a more-complete assessment of the policy distortions, it is necessary also to 
look at the other distortions which affect agriculture. Input price regulations were to a large 
extent abandoned in the early 1990s. That contributed to the initial reduction in farm 
assistance, but they have played almost no role since 1992. Exchange rate regulations too 
were either removed or substantially reduced in the early 1990s (see Tables A4 and A5 in the 
Appendix). One symbol of that is the disappearance by the mid-1990s in Poland and 
Hungary, and a few years later in Romania, of the large black market exchange rate premia of 
the mid- and late 1980s (Figure A1 in the Appendix). The effect of these changes was a 
strong reduction in the indirect taxation of agriculture and other tradable sectors through the 
exchange rate. We do not include this effect in the calculations below, however.  
Another important source of indirect distortions to agriculture is assistance to other 
sectors of the economy. For present purposes it is assumed the service sector receives no net 
assistance, and that the tariff protection provided to processed food and non-agricultural 
import-competing goods is an indicator of the level of assistance to all other tradable sectors. 
There is significant variation in tariff levels among commodity groups. According to the 
UNCTAD TRAINS tariff database, in 2001-03 CEE tariffs averaged 21 percent for processed 
foods, 6 percent for other manufacturing products, and 2 percent for non-agricultural primary 
products. (These rates compare with 11 percent for primary agricultural products.) We use 
these trade-weighted average tariffs as a proxy for the nominal rate of assistance to the 
tradable non-agricultural part of the economy (including the processed food industry),
7 call it 
NRAnonag
t. Together with the NRAag
t we are then able to calculate a Relative Rate of 
Assistance, RRA, defined as: 
RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
                                                 
7 This would be an overstatement if exporting and non-trading parts of the non-agricultural sectors receive less 
support than the import-competing parts; but it is assumed that non-tariff import barriers are still in place and 
exactly offset this bias.    16
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA cannot be less than 
-100 percent if producers are to earn anything, so too must the RRA. This measure is useful. 
If it is below zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which 
the policy regime has an anti-agricultural bias, and conversely when the RRA is positive.  
The estimated RRAs for the CEECs as a group are shown in Figure 7 and Table 3. 
According to those data, the NRA for agriculture is offset only slightly by the NRA in other 
sectors in recent years, in the early years of transition it almost completely offset assistance 
via farm programs. So the conclusion that assistance to farmers became positive by 1993 and 
steadily rose still holds: the RRA increased in CEECs from -10 percent in 1992 to 30 percent 
by 2003. And that upward trend is generally true for each of the ten countries in the region, as 
shown in Tables A6 to A25 in the Appendix, even though there is a wide range in mean 
values (ranging in 2003 from close to zero in Bulgaria to nearly 90 percent in Slovenia).  
 
Taxation of consumers 
The consumer tax equivalent (CTE), using the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology, increased 
from around -8 percent in 1992 to around 17 percent in 2000, suggesting a relative increase in 
taxation of food consumers. As with the NRAs, the 2000 CTEs vary importantly between 
countries, in roughly the same way as NRAs (Table 4).  
However, the net effect on consumers of the transition policy changes is very different 
from that indicated by this CTE change. First, the reduction of exchange rate distortions and 
removal of price fixing and subsidies at the wholesale level reduced consumer assistance (and 
thus increased relative taxation). Offsetting that, there are important benefits for consumers 
from the reforms associated with opportunity costs in acquiring food. Under the communist 
regime, consumers, unable to buy all they wanted at low prices, had to incur high search and 
queuing costs. These costs were removed with the reforms in the 1990s. Further, consumers 
benefited from greater access to a much wider variety and higher quality of food products. By 
restricting foreign imports and regulating trade, the Communist regime prevented its 
consumers from accessing quality food products. This factor of consumer taxation is typically 
not captured by distortion indicators but may be very important. Kostova Huffman and 
Johnson (2004) estimate that these welfare losses are equivalent to between 50 and 75 percent 
of the direct subsidy benefits of consumers under the communist regime – and, hence, there 
were equivalent gains with the trade liberalization in the 1990s. In combination, while the 
transition reforms have generally increased food prices (and thus hurt consumers in this way),   17
they have importantly benefited consumers by reducing the labor opportunity costs of 
acquiring food and by making available a much wider choice of options, both in terms of 
quantity and quality of food.   
 
Agricultural policy instruments and the composition of assistance 
 
The policy instruments used under the Communist regime, discussed in Liefert and Swinnen 
(2002, 2006), were changed dramatically after 1990. In a survey of CEEC agricultural policy 
instruments during transition, Hartell and Swinnen (1998, 2001) identify several phases in the 
choice and changes of agricultural policy instruments (for more details see tables A26 and 
A27 in Appendix). 
By 1990-1991, most countries removed or substantially reduced nontariff import and 
export barriers on a wide range of commodities, and reduced or eliminated production 
subsidies, leaving import tariffs as the primary instrument of market intervention. However, 
following the decline in the agricultural terms of trade, a series of non-tariff import 
interventions were introduced on a wide range of crops. Some CEECs also introduced non-
tariff food export barriers following occasional internal shortages. In the most advanced 
CEECs these non-tariff interventions evolved into a market organization system implemented 
to provide long-run support to, and interventions in, agriculture. This included variable 
import levies in combination with minimum guaranteed producer prices, and some countries 
installed production controls in combination with price support -- although implementation of 
the GATT’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture resulted later in the tariffication of 
variable import levies and some other nontariff barriers.  
In the second half of the 1990s, market price support in many CEECs became 
somewhat less important as direct support increased. These direct payments, usually in the 
form of area or headage payments, were quite often targeted to less-favored areas. Most 
countries also introduced credit subsidies for agriculture because rural credit supply was 
heavily constrained during transition. Other input subsidies included fuel tax reimbursements, 
wage subsidies, capital investment subsidies, and production input subsidies.   
  By 2001 many highly interventionist policies such as fixed or minimum guaranteed 
prices, intervention purchases, threshold triggering, and deficiency payments could be found 
throughout the CEECs. Export subsidies played a prominent role in some countries. Several 
countries announced their intention to reform their agricultural and farm policies to align   18
them more closely with the CAP. This includes the adoption of tariffs, intervention, export 
subsidies, guarantees, and a variety of direct payments.   
These policy changes are reflected in the composition of the assistance that farms 
received. While there was a significant decline in all forms of producer support in the early 
1990s, there have been important changes in the form of support over the period considered 
here. Under the Communist system, price support and output subsidies were the main 
component in CEECs. After the reforms in the early 1990s, the share of market support and 
output subsidies declined substantially, falling below 50 percent. Since then it has grown 
again to around 60 percent of NRA.   
The other important components of the CEECs’ NRA were input subsidies, direct 
payments and non-product specific subsidies. The share of input subsidies in total NRA 
varied between 10 and 30 percent during transition. Input subsidies included interest rate 
subsidies, credit guarantee schemes, fuel subsidies, support to purchase breeding materials, 
etc.  
There was a significant shift in the latter 1990s to less-distortionary assistance such as 
direct payments based on area planted/animal numbers. Their share on total NRA increased 
during transition, from almost zero to 16 percent in 2000; but still far from the share in the 
EU (at 35 percent). Decoupled payments (payments based on historical entitlements) were 
almost zero in both CEECs and the EU before 2004, but this will change importantly in the 
coming years as the CAP shifts to single farm payments in CEECs.   
Finally, “non-product specific subsidies” represent a relatively large share in the 
NRAs: in 1995 they accounted for around 20 percent and in 2003 around 10 percent. These 
can be seen in row 4 of Table 3 for CEECs as a group, and in the comparable national tables 
in the Appendix.    
As with total assistance, there are substantial variations in the composition of NRAs 
within the CEECs. The share of price support and output subsidies is very high in Lithuania, 
Poland, and Romania and low in Bulgaria and Estonia. Input subsidies were more important 
in Bulgaria and Estonia partly because rural credit problems continued to be a major problem 
there until recently and partly because price support is so low in Bulgaria and Estonia. There 
is strong variation among countries in the use of subsidies based on area planted/animal 
numbers, but in most CEECs the granting of these subsidies to farmers was not limited to 
area planted or animal numbers, so they were highly distortive. An exception is the Czech 
Republic: there they were limited to a certain area planted/animal numbers, similar to in the 
EU under its 1992 reform and Agenda 2000 where the CAP began moving away from price   19
support and output subsidies to area and animal payments that were limited to reference 
period levels. Decoupled payments based on historical entitlements were almost zero in both 
the CEECs and the EU when the Czech Republic introduced them. Its decoupled payments 






Causes of the changes in CEEC policy instruments and support levels mentioned in studies 
and discussions of this issue include irrationality and imperfect information in decision 
making by CEE governments, constraints imposed by World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership, efforts to align some policies in preparation for EU membership, and domestic 
political and economic conditions. In our view, these various causal factors should be 
considered complementary rather than competing theories in explaining the development and 
changes in CEEC policies. Further, the factors may have different impacts on the protection 
level as distinct from the instrument choice. In this section, we analyze to what extent 
political economy factors can explain the changes and variation between countries in the 
level and nature of support. 
 
Structural causes of agricultural policy distortions 
 
As explained above, after an initial period of market liberalization, many CEE governments 
have moved to intervene to varying degrees in the market, primarily and increasingly for the 
benefit of producers at the expense of food buyers and taxpayers. Swinnen (1996) argues that 
the explanation for the overall pattern of CEEC agricultural protection is largely consistent 
with political economy theory and predictions.
8 
 Political  economy  explanations of agricultural protection patterns stresses the impact 
of the structure of the economy on the distribution of costs and benefits of agricultural 
protection and of changes in the relative income situation of farmers as the primary causes of 
                                                 
8  For discussions of the importance of political economy factors for explaining general trade policies in CEECs, 
see Hillman (1994), Lemoine (1995), and Hillman and Ursprung (1996). See de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) and 
Swinnen and Van der Zee (1993) for surveys of the political economy literature related more specifically to 
agricultural policy. 
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variations in agricultural protection during different stages of economic development 
(Anderson 1995, Swinnen 1994), as well as changes in political organizational costs (Olson 
1985). Changes in the structure of the economy affect the distribution and the size of political 
costs and benefits of agricultural protection and thus the governments’ political incentives in 
decision making. 
The pattern of agricultural protection/taxation worldwide that emerges from numerous 
studies is summarized by the now well-known ‘development pattern’ and ‘anti-trade 
pattern’.
9 In addition, studies find that agricultural protection increases when farm incomes 
fall relative to the rest of the economy. There is evidence that, despite the influence of a 
variety of other factors, the policy developments in the CEECs described here are also 
consistent with these patterns.  
Table 5 reports the results from a simple regression model correlating the NRA levels 
with indicators of structural factors reflecting these patterns (GDP per capita, agricultural 
trade balance, real exchange rate, agricultural land per capita).
10 Agricultural land per capita 
is an often used indicator of a country’s comparative advantage in agricultural production. 
The real exchange rate is included as an indicator of the relative income effect, as changes in 
exchange rates, whether policy induced or the result of structural changes, have an important 
impact on the relative profitability of farms.  
 
Absolute income (“the development pattern”) 
The ‘development pattern’ refers to the often observed pattern of a gradual switch a country 
makes from taxation to protection of agricultural producers as it develops economically. 
There is also evidence that such a development relationship exists in CEECs. On average, 
protection is positively correlated with higher incomes, both across countries and over time. 
This is consistent with the earlier observation that protection was much higher in Slovenia 
(the richest CEEC) than in any other country, and lowest in Bulgaria, one of the poorest 
CEECs, and also consistent with the statistical correlation results in Table 5.    
 
Relative income and comparative advantage 
                                                 
9 See Anderson and Hayami (1986) and Lindert (1991) for countries of North America, Europe, and East Asia; 
Krueger et al. (1991) for a survey of developing countries; and Tracy (1989) and Swinnen et al. (2001) for the 
specific evolution of protection in Western European countries. 
10 Several factors are not included here, such as the share of food in consumer expenditures, the farm structure 
(e.g., large versus small farms) and its implication for effectively influencing the government, etc. See, e.g., 
Swinnen (1996) for a discussion of these factors.   21
Related to the development pattern, political economy models, both theoretically (de Gorter 
and Tsur 1991, Swinnen 1994) and empirically (e.g., Swinnen et al. 2001), show that 
agricultural support will increase when farm incomes (excluding the support) fall. The reason 
is that farmers will pressure politicians for support and politicians can gain total political 
support by reacting to this pressure by increasing subsidies. Hartell and Swinnen (2001) find 
strong support for the impact of this factor in agricultural protection in CEECs. They 
conclude that the most important factor explaining changes in support for CEEC farmers over 
the 1992-1996 period is change in the relative income position of farmers.   
Our own calculations in Table 5 also confirm that in the 1990-2003 increases in 
nominal assistance to agriculture are inversely related with changes in the exchange rate. 
When the strong revaluation in the mid-1990s had negative incentive effects on CEE 
agriculture, governments reacted by increasing assistance to farmers. Reductions in 
agricultural incentives caused by the exchange rate in the 1993-1998 period was associated 
with increasing NRAs; and the NRAs did not increase further when the exchange rate effect 
on incentives was relative stable in the 1998-2003 period (see Table A28 in the Appendix for 
details).  
Another aspect of this political economy mechanism is that sectors with lower (or 
declining) comparative advantage will pressure politicians to protect their sector and the 
political calculus leads to higher equilibrium subsidies for sectors with lower comparative 
advantage. Hartell and Swinnen (2001) provide evidence that, within countries, sectors with a 
low comparative advantage receive more assistance, based on data from Hungary and the 
Czech Republic.   
 
The anti-trade pattern 
The ‘anti-trade pattern’ suggests that import-competing products tend to be more assisted (or 
taxed less) than exportable products.
11 The distortions (deadweight costs) and transfer costs 
of policy intervention typically increase with the commodity’s trade balance, i.e., when its net 
exports increase. Therefore protection of the sector is found to decrease with increases in the 
trade surplus in many countries. Our data also indicate that, on average, such an anti-trade 
                                                 
11 The long-term observed trend, however, masks strong occasional fluctuations in protection levels, generally 
coinciding with periods of general macroeconomic depression and severe food shortages. These fluctuations 
demonstrate how sensitive and responsive agricultural protection (income transfers) can be to the welfare 
position of taxed groups. These fluctuations in support to agriculture are clearly visible in studies utilizing long 
time-series data such as Gardner (1987), Lindert (1991), Crommelynck et al. (1998), and Swinnen et al. (1999). 
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pattern is also present in CEECs: on average, higher protection is for import-competing 
commodities and lower protection for exported commodities (Table 5).   
 
The role of international agreements 
 
International agreements had an impact on the level and choice of agricultural policies in the 
CEECs. The CMEA regime affected policies until the start of transition. Since then the 
CEECs have been part of several multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements, such as 
membership in the WTO and regional free trade agreements and the Association Agreements 
with the EU.
12   
 
WTO 
In general, in the CEECs as elsewhere, WTO negotiations have worked to reduce the level of 
tariffs, increase market access, and prohibit certain instruments such as variable levies and 
quantitative restrictions. However, the impact has been quite different among CEECs. In 
terms of WTO commitments CEECs can be divided in two groups. The first group includes 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, which made commitments as 
part of the Uruguay negotiations (pre-UR members) and those that joined WTO after the 
Uruguay  negotiations (post-UR members). The second group includes Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.   
  The implications of joining before or after the UR agreement are substantive 
(Kazlauskiene and Meyers 2001). The CEECs that were members of the GATT prior to the 
Uruguay Round were conducting more distorting, more protectionist, and less transparent 
policies. The base period for reduction commitments of this group was prior to 1990, when 
production was still high, support for agriculture was quite strong, and the use of non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) was extensive. Countries that joined the WTO after the Uruguay Round 
already had as a starting position more liberal, less distorting, and more transparent policies. 
These policies resulted from post-1990 policy reforms, as well as the conclusion and 
implementation of a number of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and economic 
memoranda with international financial institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank). The base period for commitments of this group was the mid- to late-
                                                 
12 In general, such types of agreements can work to improve political credibility and acceptability of trade 
policies which diverge from the short run political optimum (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). By tying the 
government’s hands, such institutional arrangements reduce their choice set and alter the incentives in decision 
making.   23
1990s, when production was already considerably lower than in the pre-1990 period, and 
structural, institutional, and policy reforms were already well underway. Since tariff bindings 
are generally lower for the post-UR accession group, there are also relatively few products in 
these countries for which TRQs are included in the commitments.   
  Pre-UR WTO members were also able to negotiate non-zero commitments on export 
subsidies for major commodities. Among the post-UR group, Bulgaria was the only country that, 
for political reasons (a United Nations embargo on trade with the former Yugoslavia), succeeded 
in joining the WTO with non-zero export-subsidy commitments for its main exports, including 
cereals, oilseeds, cheese, beef, pork, and poultry (Kazlauskiene and Meyers 2003). 
 
Regional agreements: CEFTA and BAFTA 
The Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BaFTA) 
were negotiated in the 1990s. These regional trade associations and agreements imposed rules 
and restrictions on the use of trade barriers and encouraged greater regional policy 
coordination. However, the impact of these agreements on reducing agricultural policy 
distortions was generally limited since the agreements included many exceptions for 
agricultural and food products, and especially for the so-called “sensitive products” which 
made up a substantial share of production, and which were often exempted from substantive 
liberalization. 
  Still, agricultural trade liberalization within the regional trade agreements was 
stronger than CEECs agricultural trade liberalization outside. CEFTA (Central European Free 
Trade Agreement) countries had lower tariffs among themselves than they had with EU. 
However, this was not the case between CEFTA countries and Baltic countries. CEFTA 
countries had almost the same tariff rates with EU as with Baltic countries (Table A29 in the 
Appendix). 
  In some cases, these free trade area agreements create pressure for participating 
countries to harmonize agricultural policies in order to avoid arbitrage in trade. In the case of 
BAFTA, Kazlauskiene and Meyers (1999) argue that this was the reason why Lithuania in 
1997 began to abandon the system of minimum purchase prices introduced in 1995 for most 
farm products. Lithuania, unlike Estonia and Latvia, gave significant emphasis to price 
policies. In a free trade area this government policy reduces firm competitiveness if such a 
program leads to higher domestic producer prices than the prices in other countries that are 
part of the free trade area, and it reduces the effectiveness of the intervention purchases   24
because the support also goes to other member countries due to free flow of products across 
the borders within the free trade area. 
  In addition to being weakened because CEFTA mainly covered the least-sensitive 
products, CEEC governments regularly violated the spirit of the agreement by evoking 
national safeguard clauses in the face of strong domestic pressure. Despite these agreements, 
domestic political economy considerations played an important role in overall CEEC policy 
development including instrument choice and their reactions to economic shocks and cycles.   
  This is illustrated by CEEC governments’ reactions to spillover effects from the 1998 
Russian crisis. Difficulties in 1998 and 1999 in CEEC agriculture, following the Russian 
crises and low world market prices, induced CEEC governments to give priority to domestic 
producer pressure for protection over CEFTA. Low world prices, import pressure, and the 
loss of important CEEC export markets in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, especially for the major temperate commodities and several livestock products, 
induced major income losses for CEEC producers. Extreme reactions from producers 
prompted several CEEC governments, over the objections of Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, to indefinitely suspend further CEFTA agricultural product trade liberalization. In 
addition, some previously negotiated bilateral arrangements were scrapped, preferential tariff 
rates revoked, and tariffs raised. The response was often retaliatory tariff measures and the 
increased use of export subsidies by some countries. Normally forbidden under CEFTA rules, 
CEEC governments invoked a safeguard clause in the treaty, giving them wide latitude to 
respond to agricultural and food sector emergencies. Romania even considered withdrawing 
from CEFTA. The incidents soured trading relations between the CEECs, eroded the 
credibility of CEFTA, spurred some governments to legislate more contingency base 
insulating and distortionary instruments, and damaged efforts to liberalize trade in 
agricultural products.   
 
EU enlargement and policy alignment 
The EU accession agreements had obviously a profound impact on agricultural policy 
settings and distortions, but its impact became most noticeable primarily after 2000, and 
increasingly so the closer was EU accession in 2004. A pre-integration strategy of imitating 
EU policy instruments reduced adjustment costs at the time of EU accession. Preparation for 
EU accession was an increasingly important consideration in CEEC domestic trade and price 
setting, but primarily for instrument choice. This is formalized in the Association Agreements 
whereby the CEECs agreed to align policy and fulfill the requirements of the aquis   25
communitaire as a condition for membership. During the preparation phase, the EU provided 
assistance for legal and institution development, which further contributed to policy 
alignment.
13 
  While several experts argued in the mid-1990s that further CAP reforms would be 
required to make the CAP consistent with enlargement and WTO constraints, it was uncertain 
until just before enlargement whether CAP reform would actually occur. Before this 
information was available, CEEC policy makers, even if they wanted to base their policy 
strategy on minimizing adjustment costs of integration with the future CAP, could only try to 
hit an (albeit slowly) moving target. In fact, the final accession agreement was characterized 
by last-minute negotiations on farm subsidies and production quotas. The negotiations 
reflected demands for equal treatment and equal support for CEEC farmers within an 
enlarged EU facing budgetary constraints and WTO constraints.   
  It seems that alignment was more important in policy instrument choice than in the 
level of protection which seems to be primarily determined by political economy factors, 
where domestic pressures, political incentives, and budgetary constraints played a very 
important role. This can also be seen from the evolution of the gap in NRAs between the 
CEECs and the EU, and from the NRA differences among CEECs. The differences between 
CEECs did not diminish significantly over the 1998-2003 period. Moreover, while there was 
a reduction of the EU-CEE average NRA gap between 1992 and 1998, there was no 
significant change in this gap over the years leading up to enlargement: it was just under 4 
percentage points both in 1998 and in 2003 (c.f. Josling 2007). This is consistent with the 
conclusion that the level of assistance to farmers was determined primarily by domestic 
considerations, such as captured by our structural variables analysis (see above) and the 
budget constraints (see below), even in the years leading up to enlargement.  
 
The budget and human capital constraints 
14 
                                                 
13  However, as explained in greater detail in Hartell and Swinnen (1999), the big picture may obfuscate some 
important and complex differences of similar-looking policies, so care should be taken in interpreting the 
observations. 
14 Part of the political economy literature focuses explicitly on explaining the choice of government policy 
instruments. Changes in the structural conditions of political institutions and economies not only affect the 
preferred level of interventions but also the political costs and benefits of the use of various policy instruments 
(Campos 1989, Rodrik 1994). For example, implementation costs of farm programmes have an important 
influence on governments’ choice of policy instruments (Munk 1995, de Gorter 1994), and can vary 
considerably with farm size and structure (Sarris 1994). Exogenous factors often place limits on the scope, form, 
and operation of many support programmes. A structural change which reduces implementation costs enlarges 
or alters the instrument choice set. This helps to explain a certain degree of path dependency often observed in   26
 
Budgetary constraints played an important role in CEEC policy setting during transition, both 
in the choice of the instruments and in the level of intervention. In general, budgetary 
constraints have been the source of many reform proposals, such as in the recent experience 
of many OECD countries, and often limit the level of intervention. This has also been the 
situation in many CEECs in early transition where, due to a lack of budgetary resources, 
minimum guaranteed prices were often set at or below the cost of production as well as below 
market price. The low threshold prices, in combination with the selective use of border 
controls, ensured that intervention was needed infrequently, and when needed was always 
subject to specific quota limitations (Hartell and Swinnen 1998). 
The major institutional changes that took place in the early 1990s also had major 
implications for how government intervention could and could not work. Inexperience of 
CEEC policy makers in this area had an important effect on policy choices in the early 1990s. 
Policy initiatives undertaken by various CEEC governments shortly after liberalization were 
often rapidly overturned and seemed ill timed, contradictory, and unnecessarily painful. This 
period of stopgap policy making may be explained as the result of temporary human capital 
constraints. Previous administrative skills and understanding of policy effects in a command 
economy were inadequate in the new market environment. During this period of ‘learning-
by-doing’ in a new and difficult economic environment, policies were implemented and then 
reversed when they produced unanticipated and unwanted effects (Swinnen 1996). 
Also later during transition, even though CEEC policy choice frequently appeared 
similar to the pre-reform CAP, it in fact often operated very differently. For example, despite 
the widespread use of minimum prices, variable import levies played a minimal role in 
maintaining internal producer prices. Unlike the administration of variable import levies in 
Western Europe, the ‘variability’ was not high with adjustment usually being made on a 
monthly or less frequent basis. In this sense they acted like an additional fixed import tariff.  
With experience, increasing sophistication, and increasing economic rewards to skill and 
education, this constraint became less binding in policy instrument choice and 
implementation (Swinnen 1996, Orazem and Vodopivec 1997). 
 
 
Lessons and prospects for reforms and reducing distortions  
                                                                                                                                                        
agricultural policy. For example, Ray (1981) finds that among many OECD countries, the introduction of tariffs 
and nontariff barriers is nearly always sequential—which is what we also observe in the CEECs.       27
 
 
There have been major reductions in distortions to agricultural incentives in CEE over the 
past two decades. Much has been accomplished in removing distortions to agricultural 
incentives in CEE as dramatic changes have removed the most distortionary policy regimes. 
The liberalization of prices and trade lead to relatively low rates of assistance in the early and 
mid-1990s. 
However, there is still substantial room for further reduction of distortions to 
agricultural incentives. In fact, the CEE countries have re-introduced new distortions. Some 
have done this as part of the EU accession process; others started earlier.   
Improving policies and reducing distortions can be done through various means: 
overall reductions in support policies, shifting support to less-distortive policy instruments, 
focusing budgetary means to public good type of investments rather than farm subsidies, 
shifting from a quantity-based to a quality-based policy paradigm, etc.  
Such reforms are not inconsistent with EU accession. The EU has moved in recent 
years to more-decoupled farm support, and has given more policy attention to improving the 
efficiency of farms and food companies.  
From this perspective, it is important to point to other avenues, such as 
macroeconomic and regulatory reforms to stimulate food industry investment, labor market 
reforms to enhance off-farm employment opportunities, and credit reforms to stimulate 
improved access to rural credit. 
A crucial component of this should be a shift in the policy paradigm from policies 
focused on quantity and basic standards to a policy framework focused on quality and high 
standards. Safety and quality standards are increasingly crucial components of modern food 
chains, both domestically and internationally. With emerging technologies and the growing 
influence of large retail and processing chains, demand for traceability and high quality 
standards will further increase. These developments will also pose new policy challenges in 
terms of equity (exclusion and rent extraction) and efficiency (contracting problems, safety 
and standard disputes, etc). Traditional agricultural policies are not fit to deal with the 
challenges posed by these modern chains.   
Competition and anti-trust policy is an important area for policy attention. In supply 
chains where farms have to sell their products to trading, processing, and retailing companies, 
the ability to choose freely between companies is of crucial importance in getting better 
conditions for farms. Concentration in agribusiness and the food industry, such as the   28
increasing dominance of large retail chains in Central Europe, puts pressure on contract 
conditions and terms for farms. 
An important policy finding is that exchange rate developments have had and will 
continue to have an important impact on farmers’ incentives. Part of these exchange rate 
effects were caused or influenced by policy (e.g., government used to set exchange rates 
under the Communist regime, and pegged exchange rates still apply in some countries now), 
or they were a consequence of macroeconomic developments. In either case, over the past 
two decades exchange rate distortions and adjustments have had very substantial impacts on 
incentives, both before and during transition. The impact of this factor will be different after 
EU accession. While it is unclear how many of the CEECs will join the eurozone, their own 
exchange rate policy vis-à-vis the Euro and the appreciation of the Euro against the dollar 
affects the international competitiveness of the CEE farms.  
It is important to realize though that the political economy forces identified above 
may constrain the prospects for further reducing distortions to agricultural incentives in the 
foreseeable future, because of changes in the pressure and the constraints for policy reform.    
Overall income growth induces political economy pressures to increase assistance to 
agriculture. This is suggested by the positive relationship between agricultural protection and 
economic development, which this study also finds in CEE. Growth and improved budgetary 
situations also put the CEE governments in a stronger position to bargain with international 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in the late 1990s, because countries’ growth 
and improved fiscal positions made them less likely to be beholden to conditionlity by 
international institutions. 
The role of international institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the EBRD, 
was very important at the start of transition, as it provided policy reform guidance in all these 
countries. However, in later years this advice has been less effective. For the CEE countries 
wanting to join the EU, EU accession (or wider European integration) had taken priority. 
Moreover, they benefited strongly from private inflows of capital, know-how and technology, 
for example through large foreign direct investment in their food industries in the late 1990s 
and 2000s.  
Later on, accession of the CEE countries to the EU has increased their levels of farm 
assistance, although they now face more competition within the enlarged EU. Reducing CEE 
farm assistance in the future cannot without reducing EU protection levels. However, 
important improvements can take place by shifting to less distortive policy instruments. Some 
important reforms have been implemented or are underway in the EU with important   29
implications for distortions in the CEE, such as reforms of some of the commodity regimes 
and the shift from per hectare payments to single farm payments. The letter will be 
implemented in the CEE in the coming years.   
From the perspective of further reforms and consolidating reforms in the future, the 
ongoing WTO negotiations are important to impose discipline on agricultural policy 
distortions. Indirectly, the WTO agreements have already had major impacts on CEE 
distortions, as they have imposed constraints on the policies and the distortions that an 
enlarged EU-27 could implement, and have thus importantly contributed to the EU policy 
reforms in 2000, which is now resulting in lower distortions in the CEE than would otherwise 
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Table 1: Real agricultural income per annual work unit in CEECs after EU accession  















EU-15   3 
 
Source: European Commission (2005).  
Notes: AWU: annual work unit, equivalent to the labor of one person working full time in 
agriculture. 
* Authors’ calculation - simple average over 8 CEECs that are included in the table. 
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Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance* to agricultural industries, CEEC-10, 1992 to 2003 
(percent) 
Crop  1992  1993  1994 1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Wheat  3.3  16.7  9.3  -8.4  1.6  5.1  21.0  24.6 20.6 15.4 13.7 20.3 
Rye 5.5  -15.3  -0.5  22.6  11.5  23.6  63.8  71.4  46.8  23.5  -8.6  7.8 
Maize 21.1  36.2  9.5  0.4  -0.4  1.0  1.6  -1.5  9.1  12.3  -2.9  28.0 
Milk  3.7  25.0  25.4  27.2  21.6  35.3  79.4  45.2 32.8 29.6 48.8 61.0 
Other grains  2.7  26.5  9.2  5.5  25.9  24.7  22.7  24.5  28.9  6.3  4.7  14.5 
Barley -5.8  36.6  17.5  -11.1  -1.4  6.0  34.9  15.9  6.8  12.7  21.3  17.3 
Potatoes 23.0  15.5  -6.7  -2.0  16.9  51.9  3.4  9.3  34.8  20.5  82.6  86.2 
Oats -37.3  -18.5  -15.6  -5.3  12.8  46.1  29.3  47.5  47.8  35.3  -7.4  26.0 
Sunflower  -16.7 -19.5 -22.9  -16.8 -12.2 -14.8 -15.4  -13.3 1.6 -11.3 -9.3 -7.7 
Rape 17.8  -3.7  -17.8  -10.9  -9.8  -10.7  13.9  4.5  13.2  14.7  6.6  7.4 
Soybean  24.4  89.0  45.0 20.3  21.6  0.4  -14.9 -8.8 -4.0 27.5 19.3 -6.6 
Sugar  71.4  65.5  49.1  42.7  51.4  59.6  81.0  102.6 82.3  66.1  95.7 136.0 
Beef 5.9  -9.3  -3.0  0.5  -0.9  -1.9  19.6  9.5  6.5  39.0  38.5  23.1 
Pigmeat  -20.1 11.8 29.3  15.2 2.3  -0.9 39.0  54.4  28.5  29.7  27.7  20.1 
Poultry  17.2  33.6  52.9  53.1  43.7  43.7  62.3  52.9 50.3 55.2 80.9 66.9 
Eggs 11.4  15.1  26.8  45.7  26.2  39.7  58.6  62.5  34.7  31.1  18.4  2.7 
Sheep 82.7  34.0  35.9  86.5  52.0  40.3  59.0  6.8  -6.8  6.2  4.0  10.4 
                     
Importables  4.6  24.5  23.8  20.8  15.2  19.1  49.8  42.0 29.8 33.3 34.4 43.0 
Exportables  -5.6 4.4 10.0  4.6 3.1 9.3 29.3  25.9  22.6  15.0  27.7  19.7 
                     
                     
Total 
agriculture  -2.6 12.1 13.5  10.4 8.0 13.1 40.3  33.0  25.0  25.7  29.7  33.3 
                     
Standard 
Deviation  33.2  29.2  23.0  29.5  22.6  22.4  27.6  30.6 23.1 17.9 30.7 34.8 
                     






64.7  64.8  63.0  61.9  63.5  64.9  64.3  62.4 64.6 66.0 63.0 61.6 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and 
UNCTAD TRAINS 
Notes: * Nominal rates of assistance are simple averages over 10 CEECs; 
       ** Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average over 10 
CEECs.    39
Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable 
sectors, and relative rate of assistance, CEEC-10, 1992 to 2003* 
(percent) 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  -2.6 12.1 13.5 10.4  8.0  13.1 40.3 33.0 25.0 25.7 29.7 33.3 
Non-covered  products  -2.6 12.1 13.5 10.4  8.0  13.1 40.3 33.0 25.0 25.7 29.7 33.3 
All agric. products
a  -2.6 12.1 13.5 10.4  8.0  13.1 40.3 33.0 25.0 25.7 29.7 33.3 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  1.8 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.5 3.7 4.5 3.8 3.4 4.0 4.7 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  -0.8 14.2 15.9 12.6 10.0 15.6 43.9 37.5 28.9 29.1 33.6 38.0 
T r a d a b l e s               
All Agriculture
a,b -0.8  14.2  15.9  12.6  10.0 15.6 43.9 37.5 28.9 29.1 33.6 38.0 
All  Non-Agriculture 10.4  10.0  10.0  5.9 5.6 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.3 5.5 5.8 
RRA
c  -10.1 3.8  5.3  6.4  4.2  10.3 37.6 31.8 23.5 23.8 26.7 30.4 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and UNCTAD 
TRAINS 
Notes:* Nominal rates of assistance are simple averages over 10 CEECs; 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t 
and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   40
Table 4: Consumer tax equivalent, CEEC-10, 1992 to 2003 
(percent)  
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Bulgaria  -34.1  -9.3  -26.1  -21.4  -35.0  -11.2  7.1  -1.9  5.2  -5.3  -9.3  13.0 
Czech R.  15.0  26.3  16.6  0.2  1.4  0.7  27.3  16.9  6.8  16.9  22.1  21.5 
Estonia  -36.9  -21.9  -8.2  1.6  5.5  3.9  24.7  5.2  5.1  5.6  10.5  13.4 
Hungary  8.5  21.7  17.9  2.9  2.5  2.2  11.6  17.1  14.9  17.3  19.6  18.7 
Latvia  -41.0  -15.7  9.3  0.2  3.0  10.5  37.3  37.9  27.7  31.7  31.8  16.0 
Lithuania  -38.8  -15.7  -15.8  2.3  4.9  13.4  41.6  43.4  24.0  21.1  29.6  24.4 
Poland  -6.5  9.2  13.1  5.7  14.6  11.9  26.2  19.9  6.2  4.3  0.0  -5.5 
Romania  2.2  28.4  15.8  4.8  4.9  1.6  47.1  30.4  25.7  65.0  45.6  61.5 
Slovakia   2.1  15.8  13.8  1.3  -6.1  2.3  21.2  15.8  7.0  3.6  10.8  13.1 
Slovenia  47.8  49.5  48.1  48.5  36.6  45.3  72.1  75.4  45.6  38.5  43.0  46.6 
                                      
CEEC-10  -8.2  8.9  8.4  4.6  3.2  8.1  31.6  26.0  16.8  19.9  20.4  22.3 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and UNCTAD 
TRAINS 
Note: Consumer tax equivalent for CEEC-10 is the simple average over 10 CEECs.   41
Table 5: Political economy regression results  
(dependent variable is NRA; data are 1990-2003) 
  Model 1  Model 2 








Agricultural trade balance  -0.26*** 
(0.005) 
– 








    
R-squared 0.29  0.09 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN and Eurostat. 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
* significant at 10 percent 
** significant at 5 percent 
*** significant at 1 percent. 
Data: unbalanced panel data for period 1990-2003. 
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Figure 1: Crop and livestock output changes in CEECs, 1989 to 2000 
























Source: Calculated from OECD data. 
Note: CEECs excluding Hungary. 
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Figure 2: Sectoral output changes in CEECs, 1990 to 2001 
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Source: Calculated using data from OECD and Sandri et al. (2006).    44
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Source: FAOSTAT 
Note: For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, data available only from 1992. 
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Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance* to exportable, import-competing and all 










1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Importables Exportables Total Ag
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN and Eurostat. 
Note: NRA for CEEC is the simple average for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Slovenia. NRA 
includes product-specific subsidies but does not include non-product specific subsidies. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN and Eurostat. 
Note: NRA for CEEC is the simple average for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. NRA includes both 
product-specific subsidies and non-product specific subsidies.   47







































































































Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN and Eurostat.  
Note: NRA includes product-specific subsidies.   48
Figure 7: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable 










1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All Agriculture All Non-Agriculture RRAc
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN and Eurostat. 
Note: NRA for CEEC is the simple average for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Slovenia. The RRA is 
defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are 
the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors, respectively. NRA for agriculture includes both product-specific subsidies and non-
product specific subsidies.   49 
Table A1: Simple average applied and bound tariffs for three sectors in CEECs and EU-15, 1999-2001 
(percent) 




















Bulgaria  23.3 7.8 6.4  2001    36.7 22.9 22.9  2001    0.6 0.3 0.3 
Czech R.  8.9 3.4  3.1  1999    9.8  4.5 3.2  2001    0.9 0.8  1.0 
Estonia  11.7 0.0 0.0  2001    18.3  7.1  7.3  2001    0.6 0.0 0.0 
Hungary  27.5 7.9 5.3  2002    28.4  7.3  4.5  2001    1.0 1.1 1.2 
Latvia  10.8 2.5 4.3  2001    36.4  8.9 10.1  2000    0.3 0.3 0.4 
Lithuania  4.8 1.2  0.4  2002    15.7 8.5 7.2  2001    0.3 0.1  0.1 
Poland  20.7 2.4 1.5  2001    36.0 10.1 8.3  2001    0.6 0.2 0.2 
Romania  23.1 8.7 6.0  1999    94.1 32.0 32.8  1999    0.2 0.3 0.2 
Slovenia  13.1 11.3 7.3  2001    23.5  23.6 24.6  2001    0.6  0.5 0.3 
CEEC  15.1 4.6 3.5      25.6 11.6 11.0      0.6 0.4 0.3 
EU-15  5.7  3.2  2 2001   7  4.1  2.1  2001    0.8  0.8  0.9 
 
Source: www.gtap.org 
Note: CEECs tariffs are simple averages, excluding Romania and Slovakia. 
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Table A2: Weighted average applied and bound tariffs for three sectors in CEECs and EU-15, 1999-2001 
(percent) 




















Bulgaria  22.2 4.7 2.5  2001    34.0 19.4  18.8  2001    0.7  0.2  0.1 
Czech R.  10.3 4.2 2.7  2002    10.0 4.2 2.5  2001    1.0  1.0  1.1 
Estonia  8.6 0.0  0.0  2001    15.2 4.8  6.4  2001    0.6 0.0  0.0 
Hungary  23.9 8.1 2.2  2002    26.1 8.3 2.4  2001    0.9  1.0  0.9 
Lithuania  4.1 0.3  0.1  2002    12.1 7.6  12.5  2001    0.3 0.0  0.0 
Latvia  10.6 1.2 2.5  2001    24.0 6.4 8.3  2000    0.4  0.2  0.3 
Poland  12.4 1.3 0.5  2001    27.6 8.1 4.5  2001    0.4  0.2  0.1 
Romania  30.2 7.0 3.7  2001          2001         
Slovenia  13.0 10.5 6.2  2001    21.9 21.6  21.5  2001    0.6  0.5  0.3 
CEEC  13.1 3.8 2.1      21.4 10.1  9.6      0.6  0.4  0.2 
EU-15  5.4 2.9  0.8  2001    6.5 3.3  0.8  2001    0.8 0.9  1 
Source: www.gtap.org 
Note: for CEECs tariffs are simple averages, Romania and Slovakia are not included   51
Table A3: Applied tariffs in CEECs, 1991 to 2003 














Czech R.  AgFood –  8.48  8.19    –  9.33  10.44 
  PrmAGR –  3.90  3.53   –  5.40  4.96 
  ProFoo –  11.87  11.41    –  12.20 13.38 
  OthPrm –  4.21  4.05    –  1.79  1.88 
  Manufa –  4.93  4.91    –  4.29  4.33 
Estonia  AgFood 0.05  11.56  11.60    0.03  8.52  7.73 
  PrmAGR 0.15  6.19  7.09  0.13  3.24  3.29 
  ProFoo 0.0  14.64 13.90    0.0  11.47  9.77 
  OthPrm 0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Manufa 0.05  0.0  0.0    0.49  0.0  0.0 
Hungary  AgFood 20.17  30.90  27.46    15.34  23.50  23.89 
  PrmAGR 10.94  20.25  19.95   8.35  18.60  19.90 
  ProFoo 26.74  37.87  31.98    20.91  26.56  25.38 
  OthPrm 7.15  4.75  5.99    2.07  1.01  1.89 
  Manufa 10.86  6.61  7.68    10.74  6.40  7.94 
Lithuania  AgFood 8.63  8.18  4.75    9.53  8.78  4.04 
  PrmAGR 3.50  3.06  2.41  2.02  2.44  2.85 
  ProFoo 11.13  10.55  6.01    13.27  11.15  4.56 
  OthPrm 0.90  1.16  0.57    0.17  0.28  0.12 
  Manufa 2.56  3.00  1.08    1.70  1.75  0.38 
Latvia  AgFood –  9.66 10.78    –  6  10.64 
  PrmAGR –  5.75  5.66   –  5.05  6.82 
  ProFoo –  11.81  13.46    –  6.48  11.89 
  OthPrm –  6.53  6.16    –  3.04  3.79 
  Manufa –  3.94  2.72    –  2.34  1.43 
Poland  AgFood 10.93  26.31  21.59    6.92  16.93  12.95 
  PrmAGR 8.09  16.45  12.57   5.04  22.89  20.50 
  ProFoo 12.79  34.04  28.33    8.50  31.44  27.61 
  OthPrm 11.04  3.39  1.82    3.26  1.12  0.53 
  Manufa 10.58  5.21  2.79    8.87  3.88  1.49 
Romania  AgFood 24.17  23.12  24.86    24.27  22.47  30.24 
  PrmAGR 21.51  13.86  15.95  19.66  15.31  18.43 
  ProFoo 25.25  27.29  29.32    29.34  27.83  37.61 
  OthPrm 10.49  5.15  7.24    3.01  1.9  2.03 
  Manufa 18.9  8.5  10.55    16.74  7.08  7.13 
Slovenia  AgFood –  12.80 10.86    –  13.34  10.21 
  PrmAGR –  7.71  7.08   –  7.32  6.20 
  ProFoo –  16.25  13.24    –  17.14 12.31 
  OthPrm –  7.01  3.74    –  5.48  2.49 
  Manufa –  11.65 6.33    –  11.80  4.12 
Slovakia  AgFood –  –  24.5    –  –  30.53 
  PrmAGR –  –  14.94   –  –  15.29 
  ProFoo –  –  31.44    –  –  36.53 
  OthPrm –  –  17.44    –  –  8.2 
  Manufa –  –  22.4    –  –  23.44 
Bulgaria  AgFood –  –  22.59    –  –  22.38 
  PrmAGR –  –  16.21   –  –  14.06 
 ProFoo  –  –  25.73    –  – 26.80 
 OthPrm  –  – 8.04    –  –  2.54 
 Manufa  –  – 8.74    –  –  7.09   52
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS 
Notes: Unbalanced panel data were available. The averages reported for the considered periods were made out 
of those years that were available.   53 
Table A4: Exchange rate regimes in the CEECs, 1990 to 2002 
  1990  1991 1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria  3 8 8 8 8  8  8 2 2  2  2  2 2 
Czech  R.  3 3 3 3 3  3  6 7 7  7  7  7 7 
Estonia  - - 2  2  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Hungary  3 3 3 3 3  6  6 6 6  6  6  6 4 
Latvia  - - 8  8  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Lithuania  - - 8  8  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Poland  3 5 5 5 5  6  6 6 6  6  8  8 8 
Romania  3 7 7 7 7  7  7 7 7  7  7  7 7 
Slovakia  3 3 3 3 3  3  6 6 7  7  7  7 7 
Slovenia  - - 7  7  7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Source: Babetski, Boone, and Maurel (2003). 
 
Notes: Exchange rate regime description: 
1: Dollarization, no separate legal tender 
2: Currency Board, currency fully backed by foreign exchange reserves 
3: Conventional Fixed Pegs, peg to another currency or currency basket within a band of at most ±1 percent 
4: Horizontal Bands, pegs with bands larger than ±1 percent 
5: Crawling Pegs, pegs with central parity periodically adjusted in fixed amounts at a fixed, pre-announced rate or in response to changes in 
selected quantitative indicators 
6: Crawling Bands, crawling pegs combined with bands of more than ±1 percent 
7: Managed Float with No Preannounced Exchange Rate Path, active intervention without precommitment to a preannounced target or path for 
the exchange rate 
8: Independent Float, market-determined exchange rate and monetary policy independent of exchange rate policy.   54
Table A5: Classification of exchange rate systems in CEECs, 1994 to 2002 
 Czech  R.  Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania Poland Slovakia  Slovenia 
Q1_1994  0  0 -  -  - 0 - 
Q2_1994  0  0 -  -  - 0 - 
Q3_1994  0  0 -  -  - 0 - 
Q4_1994  0  0 -  -  - 0 - 
Q1_1995 0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q2_1995 0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q3_1995 0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q4_1995 0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q1_1996 0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q2_1996 0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q3_1996 0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q4_1996 0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q1_1997 0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q2_1997 0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q3_1997 1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q4_1997 1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q1_1998 1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q2_1998 1  0  0.5  0  1  0  0.5 
Q3_1998 1  0  0.5  0  1  0  0.5 
Q4_1998 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q1_1999 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q2_1999 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q3_1999 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q4_1999 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q1_2000 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q2_2000 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q3_2000 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q4_2000 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q1_2001 1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q2_2001  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
Q3_2001  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
Q4_2001  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
Q1_2002  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
Q2_2002  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
Q3_2002  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
Q4_2002  1  0 1 0 1 1  0.5 
 
Source: Kowalski, Paczynski and Rawdanowicz (2003). 
Notes: "0" denotes fixed exchange rate regime, "0.5" intermediate regime, "1" floating 
regime. 
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Table A6: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Bulgaria, 1992-2005 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Importables                                           
Sugar  -34.2  -42.9  -29.5  -26.2  -26.0 -0.4 17.9 41.3 14.5 16.4  8.1  72.5 90.6 56.6 
E x p o r t a b l e s                 
Eggs  1.4  2.1  -5.5 11.9  -12.9 1.6 17.6 34.7 12.8 4.9 37.8 23.3 9.8  9.9 
Sunflower  -39.2 -29.6 -41.1 -39.9 -36.1 -29.2 -19.7 -24.0 -10.5 -15.3 -15.9  -6.9  -27.1 -14.8 
Mixed Trade Status              
Wheat  -37.8  -1.0  -31.6 -44.7 -18.1  0.2  -13.6 -11.3  -2.4  -3.6  -18.5  8.6  12.9 -29.5 
Maize  -21.1  18.5  -19.9  -21.2  -20.7 -4.0 -5.8 -16.6 0.6  7.9 -13.7 6.0 32.4 -7.5 
Milk  -31.8 10.0 -11.5 25.2 -41.0 -15.4 63.5  -6.7  15.4 -18.7 -23.8 20.4 62.3 72.0 
Barley  -31.4 14.4 -18.6 -42.8 -14.9  3.4  9.5  -15.0 -10.4 -14.5 -19.6  2.2  1.8  -17.6 
Beef  -40.1 -35.8 -36.8 -22.7 -55.2 -32.9  -2.3  -26.4  2.4  29.6  46.8  39.7  5.7  -2.1 
Pigmeat  -36.7  -7.2  -18.0  -15.4  -48.3  -15.1 7.1 16.3 4.8 -13.9  -0.8 2.4 23.7  33.6 
Poultry  -27.5 -3.5 -12.7 -6.6 -32.1 2.9  25.8 32.5 25.4 14.5 41.2 90.0  134.7  94.1 
                
Importables  0.0 -12.2  -25.3 -6.0 -28.9 -5.0 23.3 11.4 10.6  6.2  19.0 24.9 52.6 57.2 
Exportables  -25.7 0.7 -12.7  -14.3  -38.5  -13.2  -2.8 -7.6 -1.3 -9.1 -9.3 3.0  0.1 -5.8 
                
Weighted 
average of above  -25.7  -4.6  -16.3 -10.8 -35.2  -9.7  10.5  -1.8  4.9  -5.8  -6.3  10.7  13.3  15.7 
                
Standard 
Deviation  13.1 21.7 13.4 24.4 15.3 13.6 23.8 26.5 11.7 17.8 29.9 36.0 53.1 42.5 
                
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
56.7 66.1 65.6 62.5 59.7 55.3 53.9 53.3 66.4 55.6 48.4 49.5 55.7 51.7 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
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Table A7: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Bulgaria, 1992-2005 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Covered products
a  -25.7 -4.6 -16.3  -10.8  -35.2 -9.7 10.5 -1.8  4.9  -5.8 -6.3 10.7 13.3 15.7 
Non-covered  products  -25.6 -4.6 -16.3  -10.8  -35.2 -9.7 10.5 -1.8  4.9  -5.8 -6.3 10.7 13.3 15.7 
All agric. products
a  -25.6 -4.6 -16.3  -10.8  -35.2 -9.7 10.5 -1.8  4.9  -5.8 -6.3 10.7 13.3 15.7 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  0.8 2.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  -24.8 -1.8 -15.3  -10.1  -34.7 -9.4 10.6 -1.6  5.2  -5.6 -5.7 11.2 13.8 16.6 
T r a d a b l e s                 
All Agriculture
a,b  -24.8 -1.8 -15.3  -10.1  -34.7 -9.4 10.6 -1.6  5.2  -5.6 -5.7 11.2 13.8 16.6 
All  Non-Agriculture  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.4 5.4 9.4 9.3 9.3 
RRA
c  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  -10.4  -10.5  1.6 4.1 6.7 
                                            
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the 
tradables part of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A8: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Czech Republic, 1992-
2003 
Crop  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Exportables                                     
Rape  18.2  -4.4  -26.4  -22.6  -20.0  -20.0  -22.1  -15.6  -6.1  9.5  -3.5  7.9 
Eggs  15.1  1.9  16.4  29.0  14.5  34.6  51.1  50.7  35.7  25.8  13.5  3.2 
                                      
Mixed Trade Status                                   
Milk  46.7  61.3  48.4  39.9  43.8  51.6  98.1  51.6  27.5  30.6  71.4  78.4 
Wheat  -1.7  15.2  -1.2  -33.9  -25.4  -8.9  4.5  -5.7  -11.2  4.1  -0.9  0.6 
Barley  4.1  40.3  15.3  -28.9  -27.8  -10.7  18.1  -17.4  -25.3  -4.8  0.7  -6.7 
Sugar  50.5  31.6  1.6  12.8  20.5  5.3  17.4  13.5  17.5  20.9  30.4  57.8 
Beef  76.8  32.4  25.9  22.0  23.9  5.9  16.1  26.3  30.9  18.9  26.1  41.4 
Pigmeat  -12.0  18.2  11.3  3.8  6.4  -12.0  32.3  38.2  16.4  37.3  19.3  17.7 
Poultry  49.1  51.3  48.5  35.4  32.7  32.7  53.4  31.0  28.3  35.7  59.1  55.0 
                                      
Importables  3.1  40.3  16.0  13.1  13.9  5.7  47.6  47.9  26.8  38.5  54.2  55.2 
Exportables  32.0  32.0  22.6  1.0  2.9  6.0  29.2  2.7  0.9  8.0  7.4  10.9 
                                      
Weighted 
average of above  20.1  32.6  20.2  4.8  6.0  6.0  34.7  23.2  13.5  24.1  29.8  32.7 
                                      
Standard 
Deviation  30.6  22.5  24.3  28.5  26.3  25.3  34.8  27.3  21.6  15.2  27.1  30.8 
                                      
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
64.8  65.4  66.1  67.5  69.6  72.3  72.3  69.6  72.7  76.8  73.1  74.0 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
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Table A9: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Czech Republic, 1992-2003 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  20.1  32.6  20.2 4.8  6.0  6.0 34.7  23.2  13.5  24.1  29.8  32.7 
Non-covered  products  20.1  32.6  20.2 4.8  6.0  6.0 34.7  23.2  13.5  24.1  29.8  32.7 
All agric. products
a  20.1  32.6  20.2 4.8  6.0  6.0 34.7  23.2  13.5  24.1  29.8  32.7 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  1.0 1.1 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.3  3.9  4.9 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  21.1  33.8  23.6 7.6  8.7  8.8 38.2  27.0  17.4  27.4  33.7  37.6 
Tradables                
All Agriculture
a,b  21.1  33.8  23.6 7.6  8.7  8.8 38.2  27.0  17.4  27.4  33.7  37.6 
All  Non-Agriculture n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.8 5.8 5.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.3 4.3 
RRA
c  ─  ─  ─  ─  2.8  2.8  30.6  23.4 14.1 23.9 28.2 31.9 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A10: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Estonia, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
I m p o r t a b l e s               
Wheat  6.5  -5.7 -1.5  1.0  1.3  14.3 42.5 35.3 12.7 10.4 17.4  8.9 
Rye  22.4 -13.8 10.2 36.4 20.5 22.3 98.4 60.8 34.1 20.6 -2.5  3.0 
Barley  -28.3  -6.8 -9.6 16.4 8.7 12.8  70.0  33.0 2.7  1.1 17.9  11.3 
Poultry  -33.6 6.3  34.2 60.1 59.8 48.0 47.4 28.7 33.7 28.2 68.7 78.3 
              
Mixed Trade Status             
Oats  -45.9  -38.5  -27.8 -3.7 19.7 50.4 29.5 50.3 21.5  5.9 -13.8 -8.1 
Oilseeds  22.4 -2.9 -14.4  15.9 -2.0 -1.1 18.1 35.7 24.7 42.0 30.3 21.7 
Milk  -41.1  -22.4 -9.7 14.0 29.2 31.3 41.5 -7.4 14.8  7.9  22.8 42.2 
Beef  -57.1 -29.7 -23.4 -28.9 -22.9 -30.7  -7.8  -20.7 -25.9 15.7  21.1  0.1 
Pigmeat  -50.2  -22.0 15.0  0.4  -4.6 -12.1 41.9 44.7 26.3 18.0 18.7 20.4 
Eggs  -40.8  -31.8  -14.5 14.3 10.7 25.7 24.9 53.2 22.8 25.9 10.5  4.6 
              
Importables  -31.4  -18.1 -3.0 11.7 10.5 11.4 37.9 40.4 12.2 14.7 21.5 27.4 
Exportables  -50.8 -26.1 -21.1 -18.1  -2.0  -1.1  23.3  -4.7  24.7  9.6  20.6  13.5 
              
Weighted average 
of above  -39.0  -21.8  -8.1 4.4 10.4  11.3  36.8 8.9 12.5  12.1  21.1  26.2 
              
Standard 
Deviation  33.8 15.4 19.5 25.3 22.5 26.0 29.1 35.2 18.3 13.5 21.8 26.7 
              
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
58.9 64.6 54.1 59.1 62.7 63.1 63.3 54.2 61.3 65.3 62.4 59.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
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Table A11: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Estonia, 1992-2003 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  -39.0  -21.8 -8.1  4.4  10.4 11.3 36.8  8.9  12.5 12.1 21.1 26.2 
Non-covered  products  -39.0  -21.8 -8.1  4.4  10.4 11.3 36.8  8.9  12.5 12.1 21.1 26.2 
All agric. products
a  -39.0  -21.8 -8.1  4.4  10.4 11.3 36.8  8.9  12.5 12.1 21.1 26.2 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  1.4 2.2 2.2 3.6 2.5 2.3 3.9 3.6 2.6 1.3 2.2 3.8 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  -37.7  -19.6 -5.8  8.0  12.9 13.6 40.7 12.5 15.1 13.5 23.3 30.0 
T r a d a b l e s               
All Agriculture
a,b  -37.7  -19.6 -5.8  8.0  12.9 13.6 40.7 12.5 15.1 13.5 23.3 30.0 
All  Non-Agriculture n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
RRA
c  ─  ─  ─  7.6  12.4 13.1 40.1 12.1 14.1 12.4 22.3 28.9 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A12: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Hungary, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
E x p o r t a b l e s               
Wheat  -18.2 13.6 -2.7 -35.1 -4.2 -15.3 -9.4  15.9 12.8 -10.6  9.5  28.5 
Maize  -3.6 25.0 -2.5 -12.6  -13.4  -25.4  -22.8  -12.0 -1.0 -24.5 -9.2 31.9 
Sheep  45.8  -7.2  -11.8  -2.9 6.9 -7.2 17.2  -49.0  -53.3  -52.3  -48.3  -48.3 
Pigmeat  17.2 30.2 44.0 29.9  6.3  6.6  46.4 38.5 15.3 37.5 47.4 22.6 
Poultry  19.6 28.8 37.3 32.8 33.1 32.4 39.2 28.4 37.5 48.2 60.7 50.9 
              
Mixed Trade Status             
Milk  48.1 72.2 75.9 41.8 27.7 57.5 111.3 97.4 55.1 60.1 116.2  113.1 
Barley  -9.9 27.3 15.4  -31.5 2.6 -10.5 18.9  9.2  -0.9 -2.5  7.1 -14.7 
Sunflower  -23.7 -36.1 -17.2 -11.1  -6.8  -9.7  -8.7  -1.9  -5.2  1.5  15.3  0.8 
Sugar  99.9 84.1 70.0 64.5 74.8 94.1 81.3 128.8 94.6 110.7  232.2  286.7 
Beef  45.5 18.1 25.3 14.7 -1.0 -13.5 -6.6  4.5  3.5  6.1  8.1  7.3 
Eggs  63.2 52.3 59.3 59.8 33.8 62.8 81.4 95.8 68.3 81.9 26.9  -9.8 
Potatoes  23.0 15.5 -6.7 -2.0 16.9 51.9  3.4  9.3  34.8 20.5 82.6 86.2 
              
Importables  23.0 49.9 41.6 21.3  2.6  0.0  3.4  9.3  18.1 50.9 38.4 61.2 
Exportables  15.4 21.8 15.3 4.4  6.7  4.8 22.4 25.5 21.9 13.4 34.3 32.2 
              
Weighted 
average of above  15.8 27.5 23.3 7.3  6.5  4.8 21.4 24.6 21.7 17.2 34.5 33.9 
              
Standard 
Deviation  38.1 32.3 33.1 33.9 26.0 41.9 43.8 52.1 39.1 47.0 74.0 88.5 
              
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
74.9 73.3 73.6 71.6 67.2 73.6 71.1 71.4 72.5 78.1 74.8 75.0 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
   62
 
Table A13: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Hungary, 1992-2003 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  15.8 27.5 23.3 7.3  6.5  4.8 21.4 24.6 21.7 17.2 34.5 33.9 
Non-covered  products  15.8 27.5 23.3 7.3  6.5  4.8 21.4 24.6 21.7 17.2 34.5 33.9 
All agric. products
a  15.8 27.5 23.3 7.3  6.5  4.8 21.4 24.6 21.7 17.2 34.5 33.9 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  0.0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.7 4.3 8.2 4.3 5.6 10.1  8.9 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  15.8 28.0 23.7 7.4  6.6  6.5 25.7 32.8 26.0 22.8 44.6 42.8 
Tradables              
All Agriculture
a,b  15.8 28.0 23.7 7.4  6.6  6.5 25.7 32.8 26.0 22.8 44.6 42.8 
All  Non-Agriculture 10.1 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 7.8 7.8 
RRA
c  5.1  17.4 13.5 -1.5 -1.7  2.3 20.7 27.5 20.9 17.8 34.1 32.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
   63
 
Table A14: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Latvia, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Importables                    
   Barley  -30.0  -16.8  -6.0  -21.7  -8.9  -3.0  26.7  29.2  18.6  6.0  8.4  -2.8 
      Poultry  -55.7 24.2 73.8 70.0 49.6 59.4 76.4  87.4  109.0 95.5 152.7 54.7 
                    
Mixed Trade Status 
   Wheat  -24.3  -21.8  -10.1  -4.0  0.5  5.1  20.6  20.0  12.1  1.9  -8.8  -5.6 
   Milk  -68.6  -40.1  -20.7  -18.6  -12.6  -6.9  15.3  5.8  -0.4  1.5  9.6  5.8 
   Rye  -5.5  -33.8  -13.5  17.3  15.7  18.3  39.4  71.6  60.1  34.2  -16.1  7.4 
   Oats  -44.5  -38.5  -11.1  -12.2  0.5  40.6  10.8  60.9  64.3  21.3  -15.4  -6.2 
   Oilseeds  8.8  -14.4  -27.1  -22.2  -22.3  9.6  144.0  25.6  23.1  31.6  4.8  -2.2 
      Sugar  64.8 77.8 77.8 55.1 58.9 83.4 135.5 126.1 100.9 100.6 109.1 133.6 
   Beef  -78.1  -66.2  -32.4  -25.8  -18.2  -28.3  -13.6  -1.6  -6.2  57.7  36.9  -9.7 
   Pigmeat  -61.3  14.5  79.2  26.6  12.1  5.8  29.6  121.8  78.0  56.7  34.8  36.8 
   Eggs  -44.2  -0.1  22.0  57.7  34.8  50.8  57.1  63.7  50.4  36.3  4.0  -9.7 
                    
Importables  -43.6 27.3 50.6 25.1 10.8 26.8 62.3  48.4  30.0  37.4  18.2  10.2 
Exportables -46.9  -45.7  -21.6  -9.3  -6.8  -2.0 19.8 37.0 48.6 14.3 52.6 46.2 




-46.0  -25.0  5.2 1.2 3.5 12.4  44.8 46.4 31.2 33.3 32.8 25.7 
                    
Standard 
Deviation  44.2 41.9 44.5 37.6 28.2 34.5 50.8  45.0  42.8  35.3  54.2  44.1 








49.8 60.4 63.6 58.5 63.4 62.7 63.8  65.8  67.9  62.8  59.1  57.4 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average   64
 
Table A15: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Latvia, 1992-2003 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  -46.0  -25.0 5.2  1.2  3.5  12.4 44.8 46.4 31.2 33.3 32.8 25.7 
Non-covered 
products  -46.0  -25.0 5.2  1.2  3.5  12.4 44.8 46.4 31.2 33.3 32.8 25.7 
All agric. products
a  -46.0  -25.0 5.2  1.2  3.5  12.4 44.8 46.4 31.2 33.3 32.8 25.7 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  0.5 0.6 1.5 2.0 1.7 1.4 3.3 7.7 6.7 6.8 2.2 5.2 
Total agriculture 
incl. NPS
a,b  -45.5  -24.4 6.8  3.2  5.1  13.8 48.1 54.1 38.0 40.2 35.0 30.9 
Tradables              
All Agriculture
a,b  -45.5  -24.4 6.8  3.2  5.1  13.8 48.1 54.1 38.0 40.2 35.0 30.9 
All Non-
Agriculture  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 
RRA
c  ─  ─  ─  ─  2.9  10.4 43.7 49.6 33.9 36.8 31.8 27.9 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A16: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Lithuania, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
I m p o r t a b l e s               
Oats  -53.4 -34.5 -39.4 -15.6 28.2  51.3  12.4  35.6  4.4  2.7  -15.2 10.4 
              
E x p o r t a b l e s               
Milk  -74.1 -57.0 -55.0 -35.5 -30.1 -20.2  2.6  -10.9 -27.0 -28.4  -9.0  -0.7 
Beef  -71.0 -48.1 -31.4 -24.3 -18.2 -15.0 27.8  10.2  -9.6  53.8  37.6  -5.2 
              
Mixed Trade Status             
Wheat  -30.9  -21.2  -26.6  -5.5 -1.5 -0.6 6.2 35.1 5.5 10.9  25.5  17.5 
Rye  -8.9 -24.2  -30.5 7.4  8.8  32.8 55.7  102.7  32.4 17.2 -4.9  4.3 
Barley  -31.4 -2.3 -15.2 -6.7  -3.4  7.3  24.1 25.8  4.6  7.7  30.9 16.5 
Oilseeds  72.8  -39.0  -28.5  -9.1 6.8 -8.5 -4.0 -9.2 17.0 19.6 15.6 11.4 
Sugar  106.6  73.6  35.3  64.9  73.3  97.2  144.7 190.4 171.8 116.0 148.7 202.6 
Pigmeat  -46.8 14.4 60.0 39.2 26.8 19.4 59.8 86.5 72.4 51.2 34.8 40.5 
Poultry  -45.3 18.6 79.0 87.5 73.6 82.4  107.6  111.1  95.8 85.9 92.5 51.8 
Eggs  -41.8  -18.1 -0.8 22.0 14.0 23.4 17.6 31.3 14.4 10.9 -9.9 -6.1 
              
Importables -2.5  19.5  35.3 24.2 23.8 56.4 97.5 64.3 38.0 33.0 34.4 79.8 
Exportables  -70.5 -49.6 -26.5 -11.4 -13.9  -6.5  18.7  35.8  17.4  12.6  32.3  3.3 




-45.9  -21.0  -18.3 0.2  3.4  13.7 41.1 42.0 22.8 17.9 32.8 33.2 
              
Standard 
Deviation  63.7 38.3 45.9 40.2 35.8 40.4 47.2 62.7 58.9 43.8 49.7 59.7 
              
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
70.8 64.1 60.7 55.5 63.0 64.2 59.1 59.2 64.1 62.1 65.6 60.2 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average   66
 
Table A17: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Lithuania, 1992-2003 
   1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  -45.9 -21.0  -18.3  0.2  3.4  13.7 41.1 42.0 22.8 17.9 32.8 33.2 
Non-covered  products  -45.9 -21.0  -18.3  0.2  3.4  13.7 41.1 42.0 22.8 17.9 32.8 33.2 
All agric. products
a  -45.9 -21.0  -18.3  0.2  3.4  13.7 41.1 42.0 22.8 17.9 32.8 33.2 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  0.9  1.2  2.9  2.3 2.7 3.3 3.6 4.5 4.4 3.9 4.9 6.1 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  -45.0 -19.8  -15.5  2.5  6.1  17.0 44.7 46.5 27.3 21.8 37.7 39.3 
T r a d a b l e s                  
All Agriculture
a,b  -45.0 -19.8  -15.5  2.5  6.1  17.0 44.7 46.5 27.3 21.8 37.7 39.3 
All  Non-Agriculture  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.6 0.6 
RRA
c  ─  ─  ─  -0.2  3.3  14.3 41.4 43.2 24.4 19.1 36.9 38.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A18: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Poland, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
I m p o r t a b l e s                
      Maize  40.2 33.4 29.2 24.5 23.4 27.7  30.1  0.4  -3.8  7.2  13.4  8.9 
                
Mixed Trade Status 
      Wheat  10.0 23.0 11.3  9.0  27.9 22.2  30.2  15.4 22.6 18.8 15.4  5.8 
      Milk  17.0 19.1  5.2  17.7 23.4 34.0  51.8  38.6 34.5 34.6 36.3 28.1 
      Other  grains  2.7 26.5 9.2  5.5 25.9  24.7 22.7 24.5  28.9 6.3  4.7 14.5 
      Oilseeds  16.1 23.3 38.4 11.6 25.4  9.2  14.7  10.7 26.4 11.5  7.3  16.8 
   Sugar  26.1  14.1  18.4 19.6 35.4 28.7  42.0  43.1 62.9 40.1 48.8 52.2 
      Beef  15.4  5.4  16.2  12.6  45.6  28.7  19.0  -12.0 -33.5 -29.7 -38.6 -43.7 
   Sheep  9.6  4.0  21.8  19.4  10.9  11.3  9.2  -52.2  -47.6  -11.7  -11.9  -1.2 
   Pigmeat  -31.7  -6.7  8.9  -11.7  -15.7  -14.4  12.5  18.3  -18.1  -13.7  -19.8  -29.4 
      Poultry  59.3 32.9 65.6 48.1 54.2 32.4  40.7  29.8 11.9  9.2  10.1  1.6 
      Eggs  72.8 63.7 92.3 93.8 68.2 58.9 109.1 98.2 55.5 18.3  6.5 -13.9 
                
Importables  23.4 11.9 15.5 19.5 35.4 28.1  43.4  38.3 31.5 22.9  6.1  23.8 
Exportables  -24.2 0.0 20.2 -6.8  4.1  7.2  17.0  15.3  -12.0 -8.8  4.4 -18.8 
                
Weighted 
average of 
NRA of above 
-3.9 11.9 16.1  8.1  15.6 14.3  29.8  24.6 10.8  8.0  4.7  -3.3 
                
Standard 
Deviation  38.9 21.3 30.3 31.6 26.5 20.8  28.6  37.6 35.2 20.6 24.3 27.3 
                






70.0 59.0 60.1 55.3 61.7 63.8  65.2  61.9 53.6 55.7 55.7 54.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
   68
 
Table A19: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Poland, 1992-2003 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered products
a  -3.9 11.9  16.1 8.1 15.6  14.3  29.8  24.6  10.8 8.0 4.7 -3.3 
Non-covered  products  -3.9 11.9  16.1 8.1 15.6  14.3  29.8  24.6  10.8 8.0 4.7 -3.3 
All agric. products
a  -3.9 11.9  16.1 8.1 15.6  14.3  29.8  24.6  10.8 8.0 4.7 -3.3 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  2.1 2.3 2.3 1.1 1.8 3.7 4.3 2.3 1.9 1.5 2.8 1.7 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  -1.7 14.3  18.5 9.2 17.4  18.0  34.2  26.8  12.7 9.5 7.4 -1.6 
Tradables              
All Agriculture
a,b  -1.7 14.3  18.5 9.2 17.4  18.0  34.2  26.8  12.7 9.5 7.4 -1.6 
All  Non-Agriculture 9.8 9.8 9.8 6.3 8.3 6.9 5.4 3.2 2.8 2.3 3.0 2.0 
RRA
c  -10.5  4.1 7.9 2.8 8.5  10.4  27.3  22.9  9.6 7.1 4.3  -3.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A20: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Romania, 1992-2005 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
I m p o r t a b l e s                 
Milk  -8.4 34.6 65.2 61.7 67.6 62.7  146.6  75.1 78.5 94.3 87.8  126.4  142.6  169.3 
Sugar  130.8 171.7 159.8 100.4 124.8 113.3 126.9 180.6 140.7  90.0  173.3 227.7 292.9 308.8 
Poultry  37.1 22.1 57.4 40.3 31.4 32.7  100.9  55.9 45.4  129.6  192.0  146.4  167.0  50.9 
                
E x p o r t a b l e s                
Rape  -30.6 15.9 -39.5 -45.0 -45.0 -52.0 -36.3 -19.1  -4.3  -3.6  3.3  4.5  -2.3  15.6 
                
Mixed Trade Status 
Wheat  33.4 49.4 56.1 -1.9 23.2 -4.2 15.8 26.4 48.2 54.2 17.5 60.6 36.5 22.2 
Maize  15.0 66.8 14.8 -8.1  1.9  5.6  8.4  17.5 23.0 67.8  7.2  74.9 78.8 28.4 
Barley  -11.3  100.1  50.3 -10.0 19.9 -4.0 24.0 16.2 13.9 35.9 16.3 73.2 60.0 32.9 
Soybean  24.4 89.0 45.0 20.3 21.6  0.4 -14.9 -8.8 -4.0 27.5 19.3 -6.6 -2.0 -3.8 
Oats  -23.9 21.4 -4.9 -1.4 13.7 25.1 49.3 56.0  101.7  124.0  12.7  124.4  67.8 59.9 
Sunflower  -15.0  -5.4  -12.3 -15.7  -5.2  -22.0 -19.7 -21.5  -1.5  -16.0 -22.7 -28.6  -4.6  2.7 
Beef  33.1 -15.5 -27.9 -25.9 -31.7 -34.6 51.7  -2.6  -15.7 84.2  92.8  37.4  7.1  46.8 
Pigmeat  -1.3 18.7 29.1 21.1 10.5 -26.2 53.9 26.5  4.3  54.5 64.1 11.1 39.7 70.3 
Eggs  6.9  30.1 47.4 71.0 39.7 61.8  111.8  86.9 17.3 73.7 46.1 21.8  101.0  138.3 
                
Importables  12.4 52.0 44.2 32.3 35.6 28.1 90.2 50.2 37.6 73.9 85.3 70.2 71.2 69.8 
Exportables  7.2 9.2 4.2 1.8 7.5 -4.4 4.9  12.2  16.9  7.7 5.8  -28.5  62.2  22.2 




10.0 33.8 29.8 13.7 18.3  4.4  56.2 33.1 33.3 68.7 50.1 61.8 68.0 56.5 
                
Standard 
Deviation  41.8 52.1 51.6 42.1 42.7 46.8 59.6 55.4 47.1 44.5 66.2 73.0 85.6 88.6 
                






63.0 57.7 55.5 57.2 59.1 61.7 59.8 54.9 54.3 65.0 58.4 55.1 55.3 48.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
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Table A21: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Romania, 1992-2005 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Covered  products  10.0 33.8 29.8 13.7 18.3  4.4  56.2 33.1 33.3 68.7 50.1 61.8 68.0 56.5 
Non-covered  products 10.0 33.8 29.8 13.7 18.3  4.4  56.2 33.1 33.3 68.7 50.1 61.8 68.0 56.5 
All agric. products
a  10.0 33.8 29.8 13.7 18.3  4.4  56.2 33.1 33.3 68.7 50.1 61.8 68.0 56.5 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  1.8 2.1 2.1 2.7 1.6 1.5 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.9 3.9 1.8 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  11.8 35.8 31.8 16.4 19.9  5.9  59.3 35.2 35.7 69.9 51.2 62.7 71.9 58.3 
T r a d a b l e s                 
All Agriculture
a,b  11.8 35.8 31.8 16.4 19.9  5.9  59.3 35.2 35.7 69.9 51.2 62.7 71.9 58.3 
All  Non-Agriculture 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2  7.6  7.6  7.9  7.9  7.9  3.0  2.7 
RRA
c  0.5  22.2 18.6  4.7  7.9  -4.7 43.3 25.7 26.1 57.4 40.0 50.7 66.9 54.2 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the 
tradables part of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A22: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Slovakia, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
I m p o r t a b l e s               
Pigmeat  -1.0 15.4 23.4 20.4  9.8  14.3 50.4 71.2 43.6 36.1 44.7 40.8 
Sugar  72.3 44.2 24.5 18.5 25.4 36.1 52.9 43.5 55.2 25.9 23.7 51.7 
Poultry  59.1 62.3 50.2 52.7 47.8 42.5 57.9 33.6 46.6 44.0 57.4 58.9 
              
E x p o r t a b l e s               
Maize  42.1  32.0  12.8 9.1 -4.8 5.6 -3.7  -11.2  3.5 -8.8  -18.2  -1.0 
Milk  48.2 69.6 47.7 34.0 31.3 57.0 94.7 66.6 44.5 35.1 69.1 79.2 
Barley  5.2 56.8 41.1 -5.1 -20.2 3.0 47.4 4.0  -3.5 -7.7 22.1 -1.5 
Sunflower  11.1 -6.6 -21.2 -0.6 -0.7  1.8 -13.6 -5.8 23.7  -15.3  -14.1 3.8 
              
Mixed Trade Status             
Wheat  5.2 24.5  17.1  -17.9  -25.2  -6.8 18.2 7.2 11.2 -3.9 -1.8 0.5 
Rye  13.9 10.8 31.8 29.3  1.1  20.9 61.7 50.5 60.5 22.0 -10.9 16.4 
Rape  16.8 -4.4 -27.1 -4.7 -11.6  -12.4  -17.4 3.0  11.8 -7.5 -11.5 -8.5 
Oats  -19.0 -2.5  5.4  6.3  1.8  63.4 44.5 34.9 46.8 22.7 -5.5  9.5 
Beef  72.2 12.4 13.5 15.2  6.3  4.1  -0.4  2.8  9.2  9.5  2.1  16.7 
Eggs  35.0 28.0 26.8 37.2 16.9 36.4 49.6 45.6 42.3 23.1 19.5 13.1 
              
Importables  24.6 23.2 20.7 20.2 14.1 17.1 39.7 43.5 31.9 20.3 34.0 29.5 
Exportables  23.9 40.9 29.6  6.8  -3.2 14.6 36.1 21.4 28.4 11.6 17.6 30.3 
              
Weighted 
average of above  24.3 30.8 24.8 12.7  3.8  15.7 37.9 31.5 30.6 16.8 24.2 29.9 
              
Standard 
Deviation  29.4 26.0 24.2 20.0 20.7 24.9 34.3 28.5 21.7 20.4 30.8 28.7 
              
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
76.2 78.0 75.1 72.9 72.2 76.0 76.3 75.1 74.1 77.6 76.5 71.5 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average   72
 
Table A23: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Slovakia, 1992-2003 
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Covered products  24.3  30.8  24.8  12.7  3.8  15.7  37.9  31.5  30.6  16.8  24.2  29.9 
Non-covered products  24.3  30.8  24.8  12.7  3.8  15.7  37.9  31.5  30.6  16.8  24.2  29.9 
All agric. products
a  24.3  30.8  24.8  12.7  3.8  15.7  37.9  31.5  30.6  16.8  24.2  29.9 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  5.8  4.5  4.7  4.1  3.2  3.4  4.7  4.8  4.5  3.3  5.5  5.2 
Total agriculture incl. 
NPS
a,b  30.1  35.3  29.5  16.8  6.9  19.1  42.6  36.3  35.0  20.1  29.7  35.1 
Tradables                                     
All Agriculture
a,b  30.1  35.3  29.5  16.8  6.9  19.1  42.6  36.3  35.0  20.1  29.7  35.1 
All Non-Agriculture  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  21.3  21.3 
RRA
c  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  6.9  11.3 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A24: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Slovenia, 1992-2003 
Crop  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
I m p o r t a b l e s               
Pigmeat  22.8 42.1 40.6 37.7 19.5 24.7 56.4 82.1 42.5 33.3 33.4 38.0 
Wheat  90.9 90.6 82.2 48.7 37.7 44.4 94.5  107.2  94.7 71.8 81.4 77.3 
Sugar  125.9  135.8  84.2 75.1 75.7 78.9  110.7  156.4  83.0 74.3 87.2  139.2 
Maize  53.8 41.3 22.5 10.5 11.2 -3.6  3.6  13.0 32.2 23.9  2.7  47.6 
Barley  80.9  116.2  84.8 30.6 31.1 55.7 75.1 58.1 61.8 93.3  107.4  78.5 
Sheep  192.9 105.2  97.8  242.9 138.2 116.8 150.6 121.7  80.5  82.6  72.2  80.7 
Exportables              
Milk  101.1 102.3 108.3  91.5  77.0  101.6 168.6 141.6  85.0  79.0  107.9 116.8 
Poultry  109.9  92.9 95.3  110.4  87.1 71.4 73.7 90.7 69.3 61.0 74.4 81.7 
              
Mixed Trade Status             
Beef  61.7 33.7 40.8 68.2 62.5 97.4  112.0  114.6  109.7  143.7  151.6  147.4 
Eggs  46.8 22.9 24.8 60.2 42.3 41.5 65.5 64.9 27.0  9.8  28.5  0.3 
              
Importables  37.4 50.8 42.5 46.3 34.6 22.9 52.6 66.1 61.3 35.3 32.9 47.4 
Exportables  83.4 61.0 90.0 92.3 73.9 87.3  123.9  121.8  80.6 90.6  111.4  104.7 
              
Weighted 
average of above  64.3 57.0 58.3 62.2 48.0 58.5 89.3 97.7 69.1 64.5 73.0 82.4 
              
Standard 
Deviation  54.7 45.5 34.0 67.1 39.6 37.8 47.7 42.7 27.4 38.6 43.9 45.5 
              
Share of above 
products in total 
gross value of 
agricultural 
production* 
62.1 59.8 55.8 59.1 56.3 55.9 58.5 59.1 58.9 61.5 56.0 58.9 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
* Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices and is simple average 
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Table A25: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, Slovenia, 1992-2003 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Covered  products  64.3 57.0 58.3 62.2 48.0 58.5 89.3 97.7 69.1 64.5 73.0 82.4 
Non-covered  products 64.3 57.0 58.3 62.2 48.0 58.5 89.3 97.7 69.1 64.5 73.0 82.4 
All agric. products
a  64.3 57.0 58.3 62.2 48.0 58.5 89.3 97.7 69.1 64.5 73.0 82.4 
Non-product specific 
assistance (NPS)  3.4 3.1 3.0 3.3 2.9 4.6 6.1 7.9 7.4 6.7 6.5 9.7 
Total agriculture 
incl. NPS
a,b  67.7 60.1 61.3 65.5 50.9 63.1 95.4 105.6 76.5 71.2 79.5 92.0 
T r a d a b l e s               
All Agriculture
a,b  67.7 60.1 61.3 65.5 50.9 63.1 95.4 105.6 76.5 71.2 79.5 92.0 
All  Non-Agriculture  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.5  11.5  10.1 1.5 1.5 
RRA
c  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  84.4 58.3 55.6 76.9 89.1 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD, FAOSTAT, UN, Eurostat, and Unctad 
Trains 
a NRA including product-specific subsidies; 
b NRA including other (incl. decoupled & non-product-specific) subsidies; 
c The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table A26: The development of trade and price policies among CEECs, 1990 to 1996 
Instrument Country  Commodity  Date 
Import tariffs  All  All  1990 
Nontariff barriers (NTBs)       
Removal or substantial 




























Most including processed 
  food, fruit juice, dairy 
  products 
Most agrofood products and 
  some inputs 
Temperate zone agricultural 





















Important food commodities 
Grains, oilseeds, poultry, 
  bovine animals 
Grains, flour, seeds, livestock, 
  sunflower oil 
Grains, flour, sugar, milk, 
  animals 
















Oilseeds, sugar prod., wine, 
  live animals, beef, poultry, 
  butter, starches 
Meat, milk products, cereals, 







Credit programs  All  Working capital, capital 
  investment, processing and 
  storage, loan guarantees 
1990-1996 
Minimum and guaranteed prices 














Mainly milk, sugar pork, wheat; 
others ad hoc 
1990-1996 
 










1 Includes various combinations of import and export licensing and fees, import quotas, global quotas, 
monopolized importing agencies, exchange rate manipulation, etc. 
2 Primarily permits and fees but also licenses, taxes, quotas, and, in extreme situations, export 
prohibitions 
3 Variable import levies or similarly named mechanisms which bridge the difference between some 
predetermined threshold price and the lower international price for a commodity 
4 Variable import levies have been abolished and tariffs increased for affected products in 1995 under 
these countries’ Uruguay Round GATT commitments 
Source: Hartell and Swinnen (2001).   76 
Table A27: Summary of policy instrument developments in selected CEECs, 1998-1999 
Country  Market and Price Support  Domestic Support  Credit Programmes 
Bulgaria  •  Import duties, tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
•  Export constraints liberalized 
•  Price intervention abolished 
•  Intervention purchases of grains for market stabilization 
•  Temporary import ban on vegetables; ban on meat cuts for 
processing as a public health measure 
•  Direct payments (financial support 
and investment stimulation under 
numerous programs) 
•  Grain storage support 
•  Temporary discount on freight costs 
for grains 
•  Preferential credit for 
production and harvest of wheat, 
maize, sunflower and sugar 
•  Interest subsidies on loans 
 
Estonia  •  Effectively none 
•  Limited export marketing credits 
•  Removed system of import quotas for grain 
•  Food import licenses fee increased 
•  Announced: customs tariffs to be introduced in 2000; policy 
reforms planed to bring farm policy in line with the EU 
•  Direct payments: dairy cow and 
arable crops; allowances for hardship 
•  Subsidies: capital investments, fuel 
tax and liming 
•  Subsidized premiums for new crop 
insurance program 
•  Long term interest rate credits 
and loan guarantees 
Czech Republic  •  Import tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
•  Price regulation: intervention and guaranteed prices subject to 
quota for wheat and planned for pork; minimum prices for milk 
•  Export subsidies: direct for milk; export credit subsidies for 
pork purchased at min. price and some other commodities ad hoc 
•  Nonautomatic export licensing: major commodities incl. 
wheat, oilseeds, isoglucos; export quota: rapeseed 
•  Contingency import protection introduced, includes: 
- additional duties effective for one year 
- import quotas for up to four years 
- minimum import prices 
•  Planned: sugar production quotas and minimum guaranteed 
prices 
•  Direct payments: area and headage 
payments (beef cattle, sheep, suckler 
cows) in LFAs; support for organic 
farming; and ‘highland’ countryside 
support 
•  Cattle herd maintenance and 
revitalization subsidy for most areas 
starting in 2000 
•  Credit subsidies and loan 
guarantees for both working capital 
and investment   77 
Table A27: Continued 
Country  Market and Price Support  Domestic Support  Credit Programmes 
Hungary  •  Import tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
•  Guidance price system with intervention: milk, beef, pigmeat 
with subsidies to processors 
•  Minimum guaranteed prices with some state purchasing: wheat 
and maize 
•  Deficiency payments for those not receiving orientation prices 
•  Export subsidies: milk, pigmeat, poultry, wine 
•  Target price with import surcharge: sugar 
•  Retaliatory duties on imported Polish food products 
•  Direct payments: area payments for 
LFAs 
•  Quality payments for pigmeat 
•  Wage subsidies for promotion of 
agricultural employment 
•  Fuel tax subsidies 
•  Various production subsidies 
•  Interest rate subsidies 
•  Capital investment grants 
•  Interest relief for land purchases 
Poland  •  Import tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
•  Intervention purchases (some with min. prices): wheat, rye, 
milk, pork; ad hoc intervention purchases and selling for others 
•  Price support, production quotas and export subsidies: sugar; 
gradual introduction for tobacco, hops, fruit, vegetables.  Plans to 
introduce quotas in milk and grains sectors in 2000 
•  Threshold system for import quantity or price triggering 
additional import levies: most crops and livestock 
•  Ad hoc (temporary) import levies: wheat, maize, sugar, pork 
•  Subsidies for productivity enhancing 
inputs and field liming 
•  Direct aid based on output to grain 
producers 
•  Rural development action planned: 
- traditional forms of support 
- support for organic farming 
- improved access to credit 
- restructuring and enlargement of 
farms 
- export support program 
•  Subsidies on loans for inputs 
Slovak Republic  •  Import tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
•  Administered prices and quota: milk 
•  Minimum prices: sugar 
•  Intervention prices: wheat, maize, slaughter bulls; ad hoc 
interventions in other commodities 
•  Export subsidies: milk, sugar, malt, tobacco, others ad hoc 
•  Nonautomatic import licenses: wheat 
•  Nonautomatic export licenses: wheat, barely, maize 
•  Import ban: Czech potatoes; import quotas: Czech pigmeat, sugar, 
beer 
•  Import surcharge until 2001 on most imports 
•  Direct payments: area payments 
for LFAs 
•  Various input subsidies 
•  Dairy cow subsidies for: 
- breeding stock and breeding 
activities 
- construction of buildings for 
cattle 
 
•  Interest subsidies, guaranteed 
loans and payment of interest 
•  Operational credit   78 
Table A27: Continued 
Country  Market and Price Support  Domestic Support  Credit Programmes 
Slovenia  •  Tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
•  Fixed prices: wheat and sugar 
•  Price regulation: milk 
•  Intermittent intervention purchases: pigmeat, wine 
•  Temporary special import levy: wheat 
•  Policy reform proposed: align market systems with the EU and 
include area payments for environmentally friendly farming, subsidies 




•  Direct payments: (headage 
payments for cow and sheep in 
LFAs) 
•  Area payments for wheat (1999) 
•  Input subsidies 
•  Export promotion 
•  Credit subsidies for working 
capital and investments 
Romania  •  Import tariffs and tariff rate quotas; additional duties ad hoc 
•  Import licensing only under preferential tariff quotas 
•  Export licenses only under EU preferential tariff quotas 
•  Export subsidy with quota: wheat, maize, pigmeat, poultry 
•  Voucher system for input 
purchases, since 1997 
•  Premia paid for wheat 
•  Subsidized seed purchases for 
arable crop producers 
•  Subsidized interest: short-term 
for current production, medium-term 
for investment, machinery 
•  Credits for purchase of live 
animals 
Source: Hartell and Swinnen (2001).   79
Table A28: Exchange rate incentive rates in CEECs – Average for Seven 
Commodities - Euro- based (absolute changes in 1998 relative to 1993, in 2003 








Bulgaria -97.1  -89.9  -12.2 
Czech R.  -39.9  -38.4  1.5 
Estonia -66.5 -64.2  2.4 
Hungary -64.6  -73.2  -8.6 
Latvia -56.6  -50.8 5.8 
Lithuania -79.0  -60.3  18.7 
Poland -74.9 -46.9 28.0 
Romania -136.4  -104.6  48.6 
Slovakia -29.5  -38.2  -8.7 
Slovenia -72.0  -70.9  1.1 
CEEC-8 -60.4  -55.4  5.0 
 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD, UN and Eurostat data 
Notes: Incentive rates were calculated based on the following seven commodities: 
wheat, other grains, beef meat, pork meat, poultry, milk, and eggs. 
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Table A29: MFN and preferential tariffs 






































































































































Bulgaria all  products 2002 11.5 4.0  4.3  X 2.5  2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6  4.4  4.9  4.8  4.9  5.0  4.9   
 Agriculture  2002  22.4  17.5  20.9  X  12.2  12.8  12.1  12.7 12.0 12.7  13.1    22.1  22.1 22.1  22.0 22.1   
  non-
agriculture  2002 8.7  0.5  0.0  X 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  2.1    0.4 0.4 0.5    0.6 0.5   
Hungary all  products 1997 14.3 9.4  9.3    4.7  X  4.4  6.0  4.7               
 Agriculture  1997  37.1  37.1  36.3    18.9  X  17.6  21.1  18.9                
 industrial  1997  8.2  2.0  2.0    0.9  X  0.9  1.9  0.9               
Slovakia all  products 2001 6.1  2.4  2.5 2.1  0.0  2.1  1.9 2.1 X 2.1     2.5  2.3  2.3     2.6  0 
 Agriculture  2001  11.8  10.8  11.1  9.4  0.0  9.2  8.4 9.5  X  9.3     11.0  10.2  10.2    11.8  0 
 industrial  2001  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  X  0.0     0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0 0 
Romania all  products 2005 17.5 4.8  5.2  3.5      X    6            6.0   
  Agriculture  2005  27.9  21.3  25.2  17.2      X     25.6            25.2   
  non-
agriculture  2005  14.8  0.5  0.0  0.0      X     1.0            1.0   
Poland all  products  1999  15.9  6.5 7.0    3.8  4.9  X            6.0        9.9 
 Agriculture  1999  17.0  15.3  13.2    3.1  5.5  X            4.2        6.1 
 Manufactures  1999  16.1  5.9  6.7    3.9  4.9  X            6.2       10.3 
Czech R.  all products  2001  6.1  2.3  2.4  2.1  X  2.0 1.9 2.1 0.0 2.0     2.4 2.2 2.2      2.5  0 
 Agriculture  2001  12.0  11.0  11.3  9.8  X  9.6  8.7 9.9  0  9.6     11.3  10.4  10.4     12 0 
  industrial  2001  4.5  0 0 0  X  0 0 0 0 0     0  0  0      0  0 
Source: WTO   81
Figure A1: Black market foreign exchange rate premia in Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania, 1986 to 1999 








































Source: Levine and Renelt; World Currency Yearbook (for 1985, 1990-93); WB 
Discussion paper no. 35. 1988; Global Development Finance; World Development 
Indicators (for 1996-1997, calculated as: parallel Xrate/official Xrate-1)*100. 
 